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I. INTRODUCTION
At the height of the Second World War, Justice William O. Douglas penned an
observation so self-evident, it was a virtual truism. AProcreation,@ he declared Ainvolves one of
the basic civil rights of man...fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.@1 At the
time, procreation through means other than sexual intercourse were unknown,2 thus Justice
Douglas= world view of human conception entailed a single scenario in which one man and one
woman melded their gametes inside the woman=s body to produce a child. By the end of the
twentieth century, this world view had shifted dramatically with the birth of reproductive
medicine B a medical specialty devoted to helping patients overcome infertility through various
methods of assisted conception. A mere three score years after Justice Douglas spoke of the
import of procreation, human offspring could be conceived in a test tube,3 with the aid of an egg
donor,4 or a sperm donor,5 or a gestational carrier,6 wreaking havoc on traditional notions of
1

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The case involved a challenge to the
Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act which permitted state officials to sexually sterilize those
convicted two or more times for felony crimes involving Amoral turpitude.@ Id. at 536. Writing for a
unanimous court in overturning the law, Justice Douglas described the case as Atouch[ing] a sensitive and
important area of human rights...the right to have offspring.@ Id. In his 2003 biography of Justice
Douglas, Bruce Allen Murphy analyzes the import of the Skinner decision, concluding that it marked a
jurisprudential turning point in constitutional law. The language discussing procreation as a basic liberty
and the consequences of its state-sponsored deprivation, Murphy writes, Awould one day be credited as a
cornerstone for the Afundamental rights@ line of cases, by which any legislation dealing with these areas
would be subjected to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than the prevailing standard, which afforded great
deference toward legislatures.@ Bruce Allen Murphy, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS 203 (2003).
2

The first report of a child conceived by means other than sexual intercourse can be traced to Dr.
John Hunter (1782-1793), a Scottish surgeon who collected the sperm from a patient who had been unable
to impregnate his wife. In 1785, Dr. Hunter used a syringe to inject the man=s sperm into the wife=s
reproductive tract, resulting in the birth of a child nine months later. See Judith F. Daar, REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 25-29 (2006) (detailing the history of assisted conception). Over the next
150 or so years, isolated cases of Aartificial insemination@ were reported, but it wasn=t until the mid-1950s
that the technique gained recognition from the medical community as a treatment for infertility, due largely
to published reports documenting pregnancies using stored frozen semen. See R. Bunge & J. Sherman,
Fertilizing Capacity of Frozen Human Spermatazoa, 172 Nature 767 (1953).
3

The world=s first Atest tube@ baby, Louise Brown, was born outside London on July 25, 1978.
See Peter Gwynne, All About That Baby, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 66. Louise was conceived using in
vitro fertilization (IVF), a medical technique in which the egg and sperm are introduced under the glare of
a laboratory petri dish, instead of in the dark quiet recesses of a woman=s fallopian tube. Once the sperm
fertilizes the egg, the resulting embryo is nurtured in the lab for several days and then transferred into a
woman=s uterus where it will, hopefully, implant and develop until birth. See generally, Peter R. Brinsden,
A TEXTBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION (1999).
4

The world=s first birth resulting from egg donation was reported in 1984 by scientists in
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reproduction and parenthood. These procreative aids, commonly referred to as assisted
reproductive technologies (ART), inject third parties into what was heretofore considered an
intimate and closed two-party relationship. The presence of third parties in the reproductive
process, be they ART providers or purveyors of human gametes,7 calls into question the
durability of Justice Douglas= averment that procreation is a basic civil right of man. With
reproduction in the modern era trending toward the technical, one wonders whether the
protections and respect accorded the traditional procreation of yesteryear apply en masse to
today=s amalgam of conception methodology.
The most obvious difference between natural and assisted conception lies in their ease of
use. The basic requirements for traditional procreation are undeniably slight B a man and a
woman with functional reproductive systems helped along by an instruction manual written by
Mother Nature herself, with perhaps a touch of tutoring by a cadre of high school biology
teachers. Assisted conception, on the other hand, is axiomatically complicated by its necessary
introduction of third parties into the reproductive process. Whether these third parties are
physicians specializing in infertility care, or strangers willing to provide the missing ingredients
for the conception and birth of a child, the addition of one or more actors to the traditional twoparty procreative process increases its complexity exponentially. The necessity of third parties in
Australia. The first known birth using AID was reported in 1884, but the practice became popularized in
the 1950s with the discovery of effective methods for cryopreservation of sperm. See Daar, supra note 2 at
28, 220.
5

The first known birth of a child conceived using donor sperm took place in 1884 with the aid of
Dr. William Pancoast of Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia. According to a later published report,
Dr. Pancoast aided a childless couple by inviting them into his classroom where an audience of medical
students sat in observation. He anaesthetized the woman and then obtained semen from the Abest looking
member of the class.@ Nine months later, a baby boy was born. The mother is reputed to have gone to her
grave none the wiser as to the manner of her son=s provenance. The husband was informed and was
reputedly delighted. The son discovered his novel history at the age of 25 when enlightened by a former
medical student who had been present at his conception. See A.D. Hard, Artificial Impregnation, 27
Medical World 163 (1909).
6

A gestational carrier refers to a women who agrees, generally for compensation, to carry a child
in her womb for another person or couple. Though this practice of Asurrogate motherhood@ has biblical
origins, recall the story in Genesis in which the handmaid Hagar, gives birth to Abraham=s son Ishmael for
the childless Sarah, surrogacy in the modern era became popularized in the 1980s following the publicity
surrounding the case of Baby M, a child born of a surrogacy contract gone awry. See In re Baby M, 109

N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
7

Human gametes refer to the cells that participates in fertilization and development of a new
organism, also known as germ cells or sex cells. The male gamete is the spermatozoon (sperm) and the
female gamete is the oocyte (egg). See McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms (4th
ed. 1989, at 2087.
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assisted conception means that reproduction is no longer purely internal, but rather is
externalized, forcing prospective parents to seek out and procure services essential to their
procreation. This article explores the accessibility of these reproductive technology services.
The notion of access to reproduction in the aftermath of Justice Douglas= broad midcentury pronouncement was, in the main, a negative right.8 Declaring procreation a Abasic civil
right of man@ meant the state was prohibited from interfering with a person=s natural ability to
procreate. This article ponders the limits of state and private conduct when a person lacks the
natural ability to reproduce. Whether the contemporary notion of access to reproduction likewise
embraces a prohibitory stance toward interference with a person=s ability to procreate with
assistance, is best revealed by a study of the current provision and denial of assisted reproductive
services.
Part II describes the rising use of reproductive technologies in the United States,
marching steadily from a rare oddity in the 1980s to a downright common form of procreation in
the 21st century, responsible for nearly 3 in every 100 births nationwide.9 By tracking the
panoply of existing reproductive technologies and the demographics of those who seek out ART
services, the potential for barriers to access comes clearly into view. Studying who needs, who
buys and who supplies assisted conception is foundational to understanding the obstacles that
ART consumers face. While Part II extolls the technical successes reproductive medicine has
wrought, it correspondingly suggests these successes have sown a pent up demand for
reproductive services that our society either cannot, or will not, accommodate.
Part III herein discusses the limitations on access to reproductive technology services,
setting forth the three major categories from which barriers arise. The first, and most farreaching barrier, is the limitation based on cost. As Part III explains, ART services are costly and
are largely excluded from coverage under most private health insurance policies. Thus, the
population who can access such services tend to display homogeneous wealth and employment
characteristics. Relatedly, a second barrier to access separates prospective patients along racial
and ethnic lines. As in access to health care generally, access to reproductive technologies is
diminished for racial and ethnic minorities as compared to non-minority populations.
Statistically, while minority men and women are more likely to suffer from infertility compared
to their non-minority counterparts, they are less likely to have and avail themselves of access to
treatment.10 The reasons for this disparity are explained in both historic and contemporary social
terms, with neither explanation yielding a satisfactory justification for the continuing barrier.
Third, reproductive services can be limited based on a patient=s marital status. Despite the fact
8

Procreative liberty as a negative right is ably discussed by John A. Robertson in his book,
CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 23 (1994).
9
10

See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
See infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
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that a third of all children in the U.S. are born to unmarried women,11 negative attitudes toward
single and same sex parenthood create barriers for unwed individuals who must look to
reproductive medicine for family formation. Recent efforts on the part of some private
physicians and public lawmakers display an unabashed desire to deny ART services to unmarried
individuals. Though the merits of such attempts seem constitutionally dubious, the mere foray
into a system that assesses the worthiness of a prospective parent based on marital status is
dangerously out of step with modern family life.
Part IV examines in more detail the potential harms that can be expected if access to
reproductive technologies is limited on the basis of the host of factors discussed in Part III,
including wealth, race, ethnicity, or marital status. The harms will likely be visited on four
distinct groups, each suffering unique damages from the various laws and practices that provoke
involuntary childlessness. The first group, infertility patients, suffer in a number of ways from
denial of services, arguably the most problematic of which is harm to dignity. The dignitary
harm to patients is explored in the greater context of the debate over the viability of intangible
harm claims as a legal remedy. While acknowledging that recovery for dignitary harm carries
burdens in terms of measurement, an argument is made that practitioners are uniquely positioned
to serve the infertile and thus may take on special obligations to avoid imposing such harms on
the patient population.
Second, harms from limited access can befall ART providers, both in terms of economic
as well as reputational damages. If treatment denials are voluntary, physicians and ancillary
health care workers will suffer loss of potential revenue, as well as loss of confidence from
eligible patients who may demonstrate solidarity with their shunned sisters by forsaking the
withholding provider in favor of one with a more inclusive policy. Even if ART denials are
involuntary, providers face harms to their pocketbooks and reputations from a potential pool of
patients who will seek services elsewhere, perhaps casting blame on the profession for failing to
prevent construction of the treatment barriers.

11

See infra note 96.
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Third, children of assisted conception can be harmed by limitations on access to
reproductive services. Already born children may face stigma as a result of the now-banned
method of their conception, while never born children are harmed in more theoretical, yet
important, ways. Finally, limiting access to reproductive technologies harms society by
expressing an attitude that stigmatizes those who are unable to achieve parenthood the oldfashioned way. This expressivist argument is explored, ultimately yielding that stigmatizing
would-be parents by depriving them the opportunity to reproduce is dangerously reminiscent of
our eugenics past, an era in which wrong-headed judgments about parental fitness culminated in
the involuntary sterilization of thousands of Americans. The need to recognize and avoid the
negative eugenics of yesteryear serves as the primary rationale for opposing limitations on access
to safe and effective methods of assisted conception. Only by insisting on access for all can we
begin to operationalize of Justice Douglas= view of procreation as a basic human right.

II. THE RISE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Rooted in the use of reproductive technologies is the condition of infertility, defined
broadly as the inability to conceive or carry a child to term.12 To my mind, infertility can be
functional or structural. Functional infertility occurs when either the woman or the man, or both,
experience a malfunction in their reproductive tract. Women can experience infertility if their
ovaries fail to produce eggs, or their fallopian tubes fail to allow eggs to pass through to the
uterus, or their uterus fails to allow a developing embryo to implant for the 40-week gestational
period. Men can experience infertility if their sperm are absent from the seminal fluid, or present
in insufficient numbers, or if they lack the ability to effectively deliver sperm into the female
reproductive tract.13 Likewise both men and women can experience infertility if their
reproductive organs have been surgically removed or rendered inoperative by medical treatment
such as radiation therapy or chemotherapy used for the treatment of cancer.14
12

The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) considers a couple infertile if they not used
contraception and not become pregnant for 12 months or more. See 1995 National Survey of Family
Growth, conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics, available at
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23.
13

For a discussion of the causes of infertility, see supra, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY, THE NEW YORK STATE TASK
FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW 8-10 (1998).
14

Today both men and women can take steps to preserve their fertility prior to undergoing
surgical or medical treatment that would otherwise render them infertile. Sperm and eggs can be extracted
prior to treatment and frozen for later use. While the ability to freeze and thaw viable sperm dates back to
the 1950s, egg cryopreservation is just now emerging as a method of fertility preservation for women. See
R. Bunge & J. Sherman, Fertilizing Capacity of Frozen Human Spermatazoa, 172 NATURE 767 (1953)
(reporting the first successful human pregnancy with frozen sperm); Sally Wadyka, For Women Worried
About Fertility, Egg Bank Is A New Option, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at 5 (describing Extend Fertility,
a new business offering egg banking to women with offices in major metropolitan areas).

6

Structural infertility occurs when an individual or couple desires to reproduce but must do
so through means other than sexual intercourse because of the social structure in which they selfidentify. Single individuals and same sex couples comprise this group of the structurally
infertile. Partnerless single individuals and gay couples who wish to reproduce and rear their
children within their existing social milieu, lack the necessary structures to achieve parenthood
on their own. Thus they must access assistance in reproduction in order to conceive and carry a
child to term.15
The data surrounding the incidence of infertility focuses largely on functional infertility,
detailing the prevalence of involuntary childlessness among heterosexual, mostly married,
couples. According to the CDC, approximately 7.1%, or 2.1 million married couples in the U.S.
are infertile.16 In 2003, the most recent year for which statistics are available, this rate of
infertility translated into 1.2 million women of reproductive age seeking infertility-related
medical services annually.17 The incidence of structural infertility B perhaps best measured by
the number of single and same sex couples who desire to reproduce B is largely unknown, as no
government surveys report such figures. Perhaps the only surrogate marker for the incidence of
structural infertility comes from anecdotal reports about the use of one type of ART B artificial
insemination by donor (AID) B by single women. Recent newspaper accounts suggest that one
15

Single individuals and same sex couples can achieve biologic parenthood in a variety of ways,
each of which requires participation by at least one other person. Single women can use AID, either with a
known or anonymous sperm donor. Lesbian couples can also use AID to impregnate one of the partners,
or they can both participate in the conception and birth of a child by contributing different reproductive
ingredients. One woman can contribute the egg to form an embryo with donor sperm using IVF, while the
other woman can gestate the child and give birth. Such was the case in a recent California Supreme Court
decision dealing with parental rights of same sex couples. See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 37 Cal. 4th
130, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (2005). Same sex male couples can contract with an gestational carrier and an
egg donor (who may be one in the same) to gestate an embryo created using sperm from one partner.
16

See National Survey of Family Growth, supra note 12, at 7. The survey also reports that rates
of infertility have decreased in the past two decades, with 2.3 married couples experiencing infertility in
1988, and 2.4 couples so reporting in 1982. Id. Other sources peg the rate of infertility among
heterosexual couples at 1 in 6, or roughly 17% of all couples. See Dolores King, What Price Pregnancy?,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1996, at A35. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine indicates
that infertility affects about ten percent of the reproductive-age population in the United States (about 6.1
million people). See ASRM Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, at

http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html.
17

See 2003 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY
AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 3 (December 2005) (hereafter 2003 ART Report), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2003/index.htm.. The number of women who have ever used infertility
services in 9.2 million, according to the National Center for Health Statistics. See National Survey of
Family Growth at 7, supra note 12.
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third of all AID consumers in the U.S. are unmarried women.18 Whatever the true incidence of
combined functional and structural infertility, the use of ART is burgeoning. It is estimated that
today=s ART industry garners annual revenues of nearly $7 billion, a figure that continues to
grow as the use of reproductive technologies soars.19
The incidence of infertility may be interesting as an epidemiological marker of societal
health, but its import to the study of accessing ART comes from measuring the percentage of
overall use of various reproductive technologies among populations who are unable to conceive
on their own. What follows are the latest figures on the use of ART nationwide, coupled with
data detailing the techniques= successes, measured according to the number of live births per
treatment cycle. While steady, continued success in achieving ART births may help explain its
concomitant rise in use, this technical data is only part of the story. In addition to being
heartened by greater odds of success, the infertile are beginning to perceive themselves more
worthy of procreative assistance than similarly situated would-be parents of generations past.
Thus, both the medical and psychological aspects of ART are worthy of exploration.

A. DUAL ACCELERATION IN THE USE AND SUCCESS OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION
1. TRACKING ART USE
There are several ways to measure the use of ARTs in the U.S. and abroad, though each
measure lacks statistical precision. Thus, the conclusions advanced herein are largely
extrapolations from existing data collected on the number of ART cycles initiated in a given year,
compared to the number of infertile individuals located within the studied jurisdiction. This
latter figure, according to the National Survey of Family Growth, has remained fairly constant
when measured in terms of married couples over the past 20 years,20 thus any increase in the
number of ART cycles likely represents greater usage of these techniques by those with
functional infertility. An ART cycle, according to the CDC, consists of several steps over an
interval of approximately 2 weeks, designed to prepared the woman to produce eggs for
fertilization and transfer back into her uterus. Typically, an ART cycle starts when a woman
begins drug therapy to stimulate her ovaries to produce multiple eggs.21
18

See Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N.Y. Times, March 19, 2006, Sec. 6, at 46
(reporting that the California Cryobank, the largest sperm bank in the country, owed a third of its business
to single women in 2005, shipping them 9,600 vials of sperm, each good for one insemination).
19

See Lori Andrews, Brave New Babies, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1356, 1360 (2006),
citing Deborah Hope, I Forgot to Buy A Baby, THE AUSTRALIAN, May 4, 2006, available at
www.theautrailian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,18338276-28737.00.html.
20

See supra note 12.

21

See 2003 ART Report, supra note 17, at 4.
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In the U.S., which houses over 400 fertility clinics,22 there were 122,872 cycles of ART
initiated in 2003, nearly double the number of cycles initiated seven years prior in 1996.23 Table
1 shows the increase in ART cycles over the 7-year period from 1996 to 2003, displaying a 90%
increase in the number of cycles initiated during that time period. The CDC, which collects and
reports the data on national ART use, does not report on the marital status or sexual orientation
of the patients who seek ART, thus it is impossible to discern what percentage of reported
treatment is going to those with structural, as opposed to functional, infertility.

22

According to the 2003 ART Report, there were 437 ART clinics in the U.S. at the time the data
was collected. See id. at 13.
23

Id. at 55, reporting a total of 64,681 cycles in 1996.
9

Table 1. ART Success Rates Over A Seven Year Period (1996-2003)

ART Event

1996

2003

Percentage Change

Number of ART Cycles
Performed

64, 681

122,872

+90%

Number of Live Babies
Born

20,840

48,756

+134%

28%

34.7%

+24%

38.9%

50.8%

+30%

Under 35

33.6%

43.2%

+29%

35-40

25.3%

31.4%

+24%

Over 40

8.4%

10.5%

+25%

Live Births Per Transfer
Using Fresh Non-Donor
Eggs
Live Births Per Transfer
Using Fresh Donor Eggs
Live Births Using NonDonor Eggs By Age

Source: 2003 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates, National Summary and
Fertility Clinic Reports (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, December 2005).

10

One possible measurement of the increase in ART use by those with structural infertility
B those who desire to become parents other than by heterosexual coupling B is the rise in the
number of children conceived using AID. The number of children born via AID rose from
approximately 30,000 in 1987 to 60,000 in 1998.24 While AID can be, and is, used by
heterosexual couples experiencing infertility, its use by single woman has risen dramatically in
recent years. As noted earlier, today single women comprise one third of the clientele of
commercial sperm banks.25 Couple this significant percentage use with a 100% increase in the
number of AID children born annually over a recent ten year period, and one might reasonably
conclude that single woman and lesbian couples are making greater use of assisted conception for
family formation.
The increasing use of ART is attributable to at least two factors B growing success rates
and a changing demographic of child-ready adult women.26 A 1998 report by the New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law noted that in addition to increasing ART success rates,
several other social factors contributed to the growing use of assisted conception, including the
phenomenon of delayed childbearing among professional women.27 Since a woman=s likelihood
of becoming pregnant and giving birth decreases with age, particularly after the age of 35,
infertility rates rise as procreation is deferred until late in the fourth decade of life.28 But linking
increased ART usage with delayed childbirth is logical only so long as methods of assisted
conception are able to yield the desired results. Women and their partners, if any, would
continue to patronize ART clinics in the numbers that they have only if they were reasonably sure
their childbearing goals could be met. A decade=s worth of data suggest that parenthood after
infertility is a realistic possibility.

24

Compare United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1988) Artificial
Insemination Practice in the United States: Summary of a 1987 Survey-Background Paper (reporting
30,000 AID births in 1987) with ISLAT Working Group, ART Into Science: Regulation of Fertility
Techniques, 281 SCIENCE 651 (1998) (reporting 60,000 AID births annually).
25

See supra note 18.

26

Importantly, increases in ART use do not seem to signal an increase in rates of infertility, at
least among married women. In fact, infertility rates among this population have decreased over the past
twenty years. See supra note 16.
27

THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 15-16 (1998) (also citing
increasing rates of chlamydia as risk factors for infertility, and difficulties in accessing adoption as reasons
for ART growth).
28

For an insightful analysis of delayed childbearing as a reaction to Asoft@ discrimination in the
workplace, see Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory
Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER, RACE AND JUSTICE 1 (2005).
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2. TRACKING ART SUCCESS
At bottom, the success of any form of assisted conception is measured strictly by its
ability to produce live, healthy babies. For over ten years, professional medical societies in the
U.S. have been collecting and reporting data on ART success rates, measured according to live
birth.29 From a macro perspective, ART in the U.S. is making a perceptible inroad into the total
population. In 2003, U.S. ART births accounted for nearly 3% of all births B specifically, 2.7
out of every 100 children born attributed their conception to some form of medical assistance.30
A quarter century ago, birth following assisted conception B particularly in vitro fertilization, the
newest ART form B was so novel it commanded newspaper coverage of the early lives of its
progeny.31 Today, IVF and other forms of ART are far more common, with nary a Gen Xer
unfamiliar with at least one friend, relative or colleague who has explored infertility treatment.
Worldwide, it is estimated that 3 million infants have been born to women using IVF, as 200,000
such babies are now born each year.32
29

In the U.S., ART data began to be collected in 1989 by the Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology (SART), which published annual reports of pregnancy success rates for fertility clinics in the
state and Canada. In 1992 Congress passed the Fertility Clinics Success Rate and Certification Act, 42
U.S.C. 263a-1, requiring the CDC to publish ART success rates in the U.S. Since 1995, the CDC has
worked in consultation with SART and ASRM to issue annual reports. See 2003 ART Report, supra note
17, at 1. In Europe, the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) has been
publishing ART success rates since 2001, covering treatment cycles beginning in 1997. See Assisted
Reproductive Technology in Europe, 2002: Results Generated from European Registers by ESHRE, 21
HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1680 (2006) (reporting results for 25 European countries).
30

According to the annual CDC report, in 2003 (the most recent year for which figures are
available) there were 48,756 children born in the U.S. who were conceived using some form of assisted
reproductive technology (ART), as defined by the CDC. In 2003, 99% of all ART cycles measured by the
CDC used IVF, with less than 1% using the related techniques of gamete intrafallopian transfer (in which
eggs and sperm are transferred into the fallopian tube) and zygote intrafallopian transfer (in which the early
embryo is transferred into the fallopian tube). See 2003 ART Report, supra note 17 at 11. In addition to
IVF births, it is estimated that 60,000 children are born annually via AID, bringing the total number of
children born through assisted conception to nearly 110,000. See supra note 24. The total birth rate for
2003 was slightly over 4 million. See http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_02.pdf (reporting
4,089,950 live births in the U.S. in 2003, up about 2% from 2002). Thus, total ART births in the U.S. in
2003 comprised nearly 2.7% of all live births.
31

See,e.g. Cole Moreton, Eye Witness: I=m Nothing Special Says World=s First Test-Tube Baby As
She Turns 25, INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY, July 25, 2003, at 5 (describing hype surrounding Louise
Brown=s birth and early years). In 2006, Louise Brown again made headlines when it was announced that
she would become a mother herself, albeit the old-fashioned way. See First Test Tube Baby is Pregnant,
BIRMINGHAM POST, July 11, 2006, at 8.
32

See European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology; Three Million Babies Have
Been Born Using Assisted Reproductive Technologies, WOMEN=S HEALTH LAW WEEKLY, July 16, 2006,
at 77 (citing a 2006 report by the International Committee for Monitoring Assisted Reproductive
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The epidemiology surrounding ART use and success over the past decade goes a long
way toward explaining its growing popularity, but more is needed to fully understand what
motivates a person with infertility to seek assisted conception. As a general matter, only half of
all individuals who are diagnosed as infertile seek treatment to assist them in reproduction.33
While a host of demographic factors, discussed fully in Part III, play into whether one is likely to
seek fertility treatment, there remains a largely unexplored inhibition that impacts on one=s desire
to access reproductive technologies B infertility stigma. Social science and medical literature
suggests that some individuals will forgo medical treatment for childlessness based on a great
aversion to infertility labels.34 Infertility stigma may continue to inhibit some individuals from
seeking ART treatment, but there are signs that its impact is dissipating thanks to slight shifts in
social and economic behaviors.

B. OVERCOMING INFERTILITY STIGMA
The emotional and psychological devastation wrought by the recognition or diagnosis of
infertility cannot be overstated. Numerous studies have reported on the severe toll that the
inability to reproduce has on both men and women. Women have been documented as suffering
from severe depression, comparable to that seen in patients with terminal diseases such as
cancer.35 Men often express feeling of being deeply demoralized, particularly if they are part of a
cultural group that considers itself pronatalist, in which children and parenthood are seen as
desirable social attributes.36 While such strong emotional reactions can be motivating to some,
prompting them to seek immediate and aggressive treatment, it can likewise for paralyzing for
others, who feel overwhelmed at the prospect of expending vast emotional and financial energies
on an otherwise natural process. To help coax those in the latter group into the treatment-seeking
group, one can observe three evolving features of ART that may assist in reducing infertility
stigma. Increasing recognition of infertility as a medical illness, increasing numbers of single
Technologies estimating the use of one million ART cycles a year, producing 200,000 babies worldwide).
33

See A. Cahndra & E. Stephen, Impaired Fecundity in the United States: 1982-1995, 30
FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 34 (1998).
34

See Lynn White, Julia McQuillan & Arthur L. Greil, Explaining Disparities in Treatment
Seeking: The Case of Infertility, 85 Fertility & Sterility 853, 856 (2006).
35

In one study, researchers discovered that infertile women=s scores on the Beck Depression
Inventory, a test used to measure the severity of depression, rivaled those of cancer patients. See Alice D.
Domar et al., The Prevalence and Predictability of Depression in Infertile Women, 58 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 1158, 1161-62 (1992), as cited in Katherine Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting The Costs of
Fertility Treatment, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1121, 1128 (2004).
36

See See Marcia C. Inhorn & Michael Hassan Fakih, Arab Americans, African Americans, and
Infertility: Barriers to Reproduction and Medical Care, 85 Fertility & Sterility 844 (2006).
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and same sex parents accessing ART, and increasing availability of third party collaborators may
help ease the transition from infertility to parenthood for those have shown reticence toward
seeking treatment.

1. FAILURE TO CONCEIVE AS A MEDICAL ILLNESS
Professional medical societies such as the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have long considered infertility to
be a medical illness.37 Infertility patient advocacy groups have likewise stressed the importance
of viewing involuntary childlessness as a medical condition for two primary reasons. First,
defining infertility as a medical problem is fundamental to securing health insurance coverage for
any treatment thereof. If, for example, state legislators can be convinced that infertility is a
medical problem with medical solutions then they may be more likely to compel insurers to
cover non-experimental treatments for the condition. Second, patient advocates have expressed
the view that by deeming infertility a medical condition, some of the blame B usually directed
toward women B and stigma associated with infertility will be reduced.38
The perception of infertility as a medical condition is gaining ground in the all-important
arena of health insurance, and thus may concomitantly reduce the shame and stigma that chill
some from seeking treatment. It appears that most insurance companies do acknowledge that
infertility is a medical condition, even if the company takes the position it is unwilling to cover
treatment expenses.39 The Second Circuit recently upheld this bifurcated view, agreeing that
infertility is a medical condition, but that failure to provide coverage for its treatment does not
violate the law. In Saks v. Franklin Covey,40 the court dismissed a challenge by a female
employee whose employer=s self insured health plan did not include coverage for several
37

The ASRM definition of infertility as a Adisease of the reproductive system@ is spelled out in
their website at, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists define Ainfertility@ as the abnormal functioning of the reproductive system. See American

College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Infertility: Causes and Treatment 1 (1992).
38

These views are expressed by RESOLVE, a national support and advocacy organization for the
infertile founded in 1974. RESOLVE has argued in a variety of forums, including state legislatures, that
infertility is and therefore should be addressed as a medical condition. See www. resolve.org.
39

Compare Egert v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, 900 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1990)
(rejecting insurance company claim that it does not consider infertility to be an illness where internal
company memoranda refer expressly to the Aillness of infertility@; company ordered to reimburse insured
for infertility treatments) with Kinzie v. Physician=s Liability Insurance Company, 750 P.2d 1140 (Ok. Civ.
App. 1987) (while plaintiff=s infertility was considered a medical condition, she was still denied insurance
coverage for treatment because conceiving a child was not considered medically necessary to her physical
health).
40

316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003).
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treatments she had undergone, including IVF. While the patient argued that denial of coverage
for infertility treatment is a violation of federal law protecting against sex, disability and
pregnancy discrimination, the court upheld the employer=s right to exclude certain (expensive)
treatments as gender-neutral.41 Thus, while insurance coverage exclusion may give rise to
financial inhibitors to accessing ART, the industry=s acknowledgment that infertility is a medical
illness helps suppress the notion of involuntary childlessness as a lifestyle choice, or even a
choice at all.

2. THE RISE OF SINGLE AND SAME SEX PARENTHOOD
The current demographics surrounding birth in the United States suggest a more
welcoming environment than eras past for so-called Anontraditional parents@ B single women and
same sex couples who may require assistance in conception. Parenthood among unmarried
women now represents a sizable portion of overall births, with 36.8% of all births in the U.S. in
2005 documented to single women.42 Birthing by older women is also on the rise, with rates up
from prior years for women of various age groups between 30 and 49.43 No doubt at least some
of the mothers in the Aunmarried@ and Aolder@ categories required assistance in reproduction. For
unmarried women who have no partner, or whose partner is female, resort to artificial
insemination or IVF is a necessary first step to parenthood. For many older women, no matter
their marital status, reproduction is often difficult without medical assistance, particularly after
the age of 40.44 Thus, the growing field of nontraditional procreators should create a more
41

Plaintiff Rochelle Saks sought reimbursement from her employer for infertility treatment
expenses, including several cycles of IVF, but was denied coverage on the basis of the health insurance
plan which excludes Asurgical impregnation procedures.@ Her lawsuit claimed that the denial of coverage
constituted a breach of her contractual rights and violated her civil rights under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ' 2000e, et seq., the Pregnancy Discrimination Act , 42 U.S.C. ' 2000e(k),
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. ' 12101, et seq., and the New York Human Rights Law,
N.Y. Exec. Law ' 290, et seq. 316 F.3d at 340.
42

See National Center for Health Statistics, BIRTHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2005, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/hestats/prelimbirths05/prelimbirths05.htm (up from 35.7%
in 2004). While I use the word Asingle women@ to describe this category, it is possible, in fact likely, that
some of the women giving birth in this category were in marriage-like relationships, either with a male or
female partner. The NCHS does not collect statistics on the social circumstances of birthing women other
than to inquire as to marital status.
43

Id. The NCHS survey reports that from 2003 to 2004, the birth rate for women aged 30B34
years increased slightly (less than 1 percent) while the rate for women aged 35B39 years rose by 4 percent.
The birth rate for women 40B44 years increased 3 percent, to 9.0, and the rate for women aged 45B49 years
increased in 2004 to 0.6 births per 1,000 women.
44

Women over the age of 37 are considered Aadvanced maternal age@ (AMA) and thus more
difficult to treat, by most fertility specialists. See Lawrence Werlin, et al., Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis As Both A Therapeutic and Diagnostic Tool in Assisted Reproductive Technology, 80 Fertility
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welcoming environment to women whose predecessors were reticent to enter the ART world.
Parenting among same sex couples also appears to be on the rise. Exact estimates of the
number of U.S. same sex couples with children vary widely, but virtually all sources agree that
the numbers have increased in recent decades.45 According to writings attributable to Dr.
Benjamin Spock, the legendary pediatrician and child care expert, as many as 10 million children
currently live with 3 million gay or lesbian parents in the United States.46 Professor Michael
Wald, citing the 1998 Census Bureau Report, pegs the number of same sex couples in the U.S. at
1.5 million, with about 200,000 of those couples living with children.47 Finally, the 2000 Census
Report states that a total of 594,000 households have partners of the same sex; 33 percent of
female same sex households had children, while 22 percent of male couples were living with
their sons and daughters.48
Whatever the actual number of same sex families, there is no dispute that gay and lesbian
couples are having children through ART, so that one partner will have a genetic tie to their
offspring. Women can use artificial insemination so that one partner can carry the couple=s child,
or both women could be involved in creating a child B one woman could donate her eggs and the
other could gestate the resulting embryos. For men, genetic childbearing depends on a surrogate
parenting arrangement, with a traditional surrogate agreeing to be inseminated, or a gestational
carrier giving birth to a child conceived with donor eggs and one of the partner=s sperm.49 Once
the child is born, the parental relationship with the nongenetic partner depends largely on state

& Sterility 467 (2003).
45

According to the National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, there were an estimated
300,000 to 500,000 gay and lesbian biological parents in 1976. In 1990, an estimated 6 to 14 million
children have a gay or lesbian parent. Between 8 and 10 million children are being raised in a gay and
lesbian household.
46

See Benjamin Spock, BABY AND CHILD CARE 685 (1998 ed.).

47

Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL. & L.
291 (2001) (citing U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, 71-73 tbl.8, v. tbl.C (March 1998
(update)).
48

See U.S. Census Bureau, Married-Couple and Unmarried Partner Households: 2000, 1,10 (Feb.
2003) (explaining that the 2000 census cannot be compared to the 1990 census with regard to same-sex
households due to changes in the editing procedures).
49

A growing number of egg donation and surrogacy agencies specialize in assisting same sex
couples. See. e.g., www.growing generations.com (Growing Generations, founded in Los Angeles in
1996, describes itself as Athe oldest and largest surrogacy and egg donation firm dedicated to serving the
gay and lesbian community.@).
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law, a complicated matter taken up with gusto by courts, lawmakers and commentators alike.50
The demographics surrounding single and same sex parenting are a display of the features
that might encourage prospective nontraditional parents to seek assistance in reproduction.
Growing use, and presumably growing acceptance of nontraditional families should lift prior
inhibitions and barriers to single and gay parenting. But a natural desire to produce and parent
offspring, coupled with a friendlier social environment for birthing and rearing children of
nonmarried individuals, has still failed to yield equal access to ART for all prospective parents.
Despite gains in reducing stigma of and discrimination toward nontraditional families, barriers to
access remain. These barriers, as explained in Part IV, are often advanced by private actors
sheltered from public prohibitions against such conduct, making expanded access difficult to
achieve.

3. THIRD PARTY DONORS AS REPRODUCTIVE COLLABORATORS
A final factor that may reduce infertility stigma is the growing use and acceptance of
third party collaborators in the reproductive process. Gamete donors B men and women who
donate sperm and eggs B and women who serve as gestational carriers, once viewed with
suspicion and mistrust, are now an integral part of the ART world.51 As noted previously, the
number of children born via sperm donation has doubled in recent years,52 while the use of donor
eggs likewise continues to climb. According to the CDC, donor egg use increased threefold in
the last seven years, with donor eggs routinely used in nearly one in every eight ART cycles.53
50

See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of

Gay Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, 46 B.C.L. Rev.1 (2005).
51

The introduction of artificial insemination by donor into American life in the 1950s brought
with it judicial proclamations that the children of such conception were Anot legitimate@ and the women
who became pregnant by such method were engaging in Amechanical adultery.@ See Strnad v. Strnad, 190
Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948) (holding child of AID was not legitimate);
Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54S. 14981 (Superior Ct., Cook Co., Dec. 13, 1954), aff=d. 12 Ill. App. 2d
473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956) (AID, with or without consent of husband, constitutes adultery by mother;
child is not legitimate child of the marriage). One of the first high court to evaluate the legality of a
surrogate parenting arrangement found the agreement a violation of state adoption laws and declared the
contract void as against public policy. In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
52

See supra note 24.

53

Compare 2003 ART Report, supra note 17 , at 50 (reporting 12% of all ART cycles involved
donor eggs, for a total of 14,323 cycles) with 1996 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS
RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 22 (1998) (reporting donor eggs used in
8% of all ART cycles, for a total of 5,162 cycles). Thus, the total number of cycles using donor eggs
nearly tripled in just 7 years. According to the CDC, in 2003, 16.5% of all ART infants born were
conceived using donor eggs. See Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance - United States, 2003,
55 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, SS-4, at 14 (May 26, 2006).
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The use of donor eggs is particularly popular among older women, who dramatically increase
their likelihood of giving birth by gestating an embryo formed from a younger donor egg.54
Finally, the number of ART clinics offering the services of gestational carriers is on the rise. In
1996, 37% of all ART clinics reported offering gestational carrier services, compared to 74% in
2003.55
The foregoing data and observations about the use of reproductive collaborators is set
forth to underscore the myriad opportunities that reproductive medicine provides for those who
wish to procreate but need assistance in so doing. If one chooses to hop the ART train, one can
ride the rails from the most basic technique of AID, to the more invasive IVF procedure, to the
most high-tech combination of donor gametes and gestational services. But this journey comes
at a price, both financial and emotional, that not all infertile individuals can or wish to embrace.
The majority of ART patients are married women age 40 and under,56 whose barriers to
access are mainly twofold B financial and psychological. If they can afford it, and they are not
sidelined by (understandable) fear or stigma, the demographic of functionally infertile has wide
access to ART. But this access belies the obstacles that can bar parenthood for a host of
subpopulations within the functionally infertile, as well as the entire group of structurally infertile
who face continuing discrimination in their reproductive quest. Women who are over 40, along
with members of both genders who are disabled,57 HIV-infected,58 single, or in a same sex
relationship often find themselves on the outside looking in to the panoply of reproductive
services,59 wanting yet being denied access to their only means of procreation.
54

In 2003, among women older than age 45, 77% of all ART cycles used donor eggs. No
wonder, the use of donor eggs yields a near 51% live birth rate for women of all ages, compared to a 34%
rate when a woman=s own eggs are used (measured across age groups B women older than age 42 have
only a 5.9% live birth rate using their own eggs). See 2003 ART Report, supra note 17, at 56, 58.
55

See 1996 ART Report, supra note 53, at 35; 2003 ART Report, supra note 17, at 75.

56

In 2003, over 90% of all ART cycles were performed on women 40 years of age or younger.
See 2003 ART Report, supra note 17, at 75.
57

The issue of ART use by disabled individuals is ably discussed in Carl H. Coleman,
Conceiving Harm: Disability Discrimination in Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 50 UCLA L. Rev.
17, 20-21, 65, 67-68 (2002).
58

For a discussion of the provision of ART services to individuals who are HIV-positive in the
U.S. and England, see Frodsham LCG, Boag F, Barton S, Gilling-Smith C, HIV and Fertility Care in the
UK: Demand and Supply, 85 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 285 (2006); Eric S. Daar & Judith F. Daar, HIV
and Fertility Care: Embarking on a Path of Knowledge and Access, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 298
(2006).
59

See, e.g., Justyn Lezin, (Mis)conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women=s
Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HAST. WOMEN=S L. J. 185
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In some ways, ART is a victim of its own success. Increasing the technical ability to
produce biologic parenthood for those whose life plans would not previously have dared to
include such joys, only makes its unavailability more stinging. For society, via its various
spokespersons, to say to certain individuals, Awe can assist you in your procreative dreams, but
we won=t@ strikes at the heart of Justice Douglas= dream of procreation as a basic civil right. If
procreation were truly a modern civil right, its exercise would not yield to judgments by
government or private actors that a person is unsuited for parenthood. After all, nature demands
no such qualification. Yet the fortuity of technology has given third parties both opportunity and
permission to create barriers to ART, the configurations of which we now explore.

III. LIMITATIONS ON ACCESS TO ART SERVICES
The steep trajectory accompanying the growing use and success of ART might at first
glance suggest a market in reproductive services that is rational and largely free of restraints.
Prospective patients who choose to enter the market, having assessed their ability to do so, can
purchase lawful reproductive services from willing providers. Assuming that this loose
description of a market system exists for the provision of medical services in general, does it also
exist for the provision of highly specialized medical services that involve the conception and
birth of a child? The answer is decidedly no. While the general medical market does display at
least two barriers to access in the form of cost for services60 and provider discretion,61 these and a
host of other barriers are magnified when the treatment involves assisted reproduction.
As a clinical matter, barriers to ART access take on two forms: they can be direct or they
can be indirect yet consequential. Direct barriers are generally easy to detect because they bar
access to ART on some explicit basis. For example, direct barriers can take the form of enacted
laws or published policies which prohibit providers from servicing a targeted population. Laws
that limit ART to married couples is an example of such a direct barrier. Additionally, direct
barriers to ART are mounted by the high cost of services which prevents many infertiles from
(2003).
60

The U.S. health care system requires insurance or private payment for even necessary health
care. For the large number of poor and/or uninsured individuals, the requirement to pay for health services
is a major barrier, if not total bar, to treatment. In 2002, 43.3 million Americans were uninsured, a total of
19.6% of all adults in our country. See Barry R. Furrow, Thomas L. Greaney, Sandra H. Johnson, Timothy
S. Jost & Robert L. Schwartz, HEALTH LAW 528 (5th ed. 2004).
61

AThe traditional legal principle governing the physician-patient relationship is that it is a
voluntary and personal relationship which the physician may choose to enter or not for a variety of reasons.
Legal obligations on the part of providers to furnish care operate as exceptions to the general rule.@ Id. at
529.
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accessing desired treatments. Barriers are direct when they are designed, either intentionally or
unintentionally, to limit or reduce the populations who can access ART services.
Indirect barriers are often more difficult to detect, and thus arguably more nefarious
because they fail to give notice to the affected population that ART services will not freely flow.
Indirect barriers to ART result when reduced access is a consequence, rather than a goal, of a
particular action. For example, past acts of discrimination and sexual stereotyping that chill
treatment-seeking by minority populations, as discussed below, is an indirect barrier to ART for
targeted populations. Importantly, whether a barrier is direct or indirect, its resulting denial of
the basic right to reproduce tears equally at the fabric of procreative opportunity.

A. LIMITATIONS BASED ON COST
Certainly the most obvious barrier to ART access is cost. The average cost for a single
cycle of IVF hovers around $10,000, but can go as high as $25,000 if features such as donor
gametes or intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI B in which a single sperm is injected into the
egg), are added.62 The costs of such treatment are generally paid directly by patients, as the vast
majority of health insurance plans do not cover treatment for infertility.63 Both logic and
empirical data dictate that a woman=s inclination to access infertility treatment is directly related
to her ability to access insurance to cover the costs of the expensive therapy. An international
comparison of treatment-seeking behaviors among the infertile bears out this cause and effect
relationship. In the U.S., where insurance coverage for ART is extremely limited, only half of all
women with infertility seek treatment.64 Compare this 50% treatment-seeking statistic with that
of Finland (67%), The Netherlands (86%) and the United Kingdom (72-95%), all countries with
national health care systems that cover at least some forms of infertility treatment.65
These disparities in treatment-seeking behavior among those who have access to health
insurance and those who do not would seem to suggest its own remedy for equality: increase
62

See Inhorn & Fakih, supra note 36 (reporting in 2002, the mean cost of IVF in the U.S. was
estimated at $9,547, and the gross national income per capita was only $33,360).
63

According to the National Conference of State Legislature, currently 14 states have legislation
requiring insurance providers to either cover (9 states) or offer to cover (5 states) treatment for fertility
diagnosis and treatment. Even when coverage is required, access to reimbursement can be limited by
restrictions on the treatments that are covered (some laws specifically exclude coverage for IVF) or the
marital status of the patient (some laws limit coverage to married couples). See States Summary of
Legislation Related to Infertility Insurance Coverage, at www.ncsl.org/programs/health.
64

See A. Cahndra & E. Stephen, Impaired Fecundity in the United States: 1982-1995, 30 Family
Planning Perspectives 34 (1998 (citing the National Survey of Family Growth statistic that half of all
women with infertility impairments do not seek treatment).
65

See White & McQuillan, supra note 34, at 855.
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access to insurance by mandating that insurers offer coverage for infertility care. This has been a
central goal for the U.S. group RESOLVE, a consumer-based national fertility association that
often lobbies state and federal legislatures on behalf of its infertile members. For years,
RESOLVE has been advocating state lawmakers to require health insurers who offer plans in
their state to cover infertility services, and the group has seen modest success.66 A little less than
a third of the states have some infertility insurance requirement B either that private insurers
provide coverage or offer to provide coverage for those covered in the jurisdiction.67
Linking mandated insurance coverage with greater utilization of infertility services would
seem a natural consequence of reducing costs to individual patients, but in fact studies show that
insurance mandates for fertility treatment have little or no overall effect on the use of such
treatments in the U.S. Researchers postulate that the reason for the low impact of insurance
mandates on treatment utilization has to do with the population of U.S. women who are affected
by changes in health insurance coverage. Since insurance mandates only affect individuals who
have access to health insurance, this group is more likely to be employed and operating at a
higher socioeconomic level than the general population. These are often the same individuals
who can access ART with their own resources, thus the marginal benefit from insurance
coverage tends not to increase usage among the insured.68 In contrast, in countries where health
insurance is not linked to wealth or employment, utilization would reflect medical need, not
unrelated socioeconomic factors.
Thus, it appears that wealth status, and to a lesser extent employment status, significantly
impact one=s ability to access ART services in the U.S. For wealthy individuals who can afford
to pay directly for these services, access, for the most part, appears to be wide open.69 For
individuals covered by private health insurance that includes infertility benefits, access would
again seem open, with limitations based on the patient=s ability to pay co-payments or noncovered services.70 But it must be noted that the group of insured individuals generally share
another common attribute B the status of being employed. Most Americans under the age of 65
(when the federal benefit of Medicare becomes activated) receive health insurance coverage as an
66

In April 2006, RESOLVE reported success in advocating for inclusion of infertility services in
the newly enacted comprehensive health care reform package adopted by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. See April 13, 2006 press release published on the RESOLVE website, www.resolve.org.
67

See supra note 63.

68

See Marianne Bitler & Lucie Schmidt, Health Disparities and Infertility: Impacts of StateLevel Insurance Mandates, 85 Fertility & Sterility 858 (2006).
69

But see infra text accompanying notes 73-111 discussing barriers based on race, ethnicity and
marital status.
70

See infra notes 195-196, discussing the problem of non-covered fertility services and
unaffordable co-payments embedded in private health insurance.
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employer benefit - 61% in 2004.71 So the true secret to improving access to infertility treatment
may rest in increasing employment among those most likely to need ART services.72
Tempting as it might be to explain infertility treatment-seeking behavior by examining
employment, on the one hand, and wealth and insurance coverage on the other, viewing access to
ART as a pure socioeconomic matter ignores other, important demographic factors that play into
an individual=s decision to seek or forgo therapy. As with access to health care in general, the
race and ethnicity of the prospective patient figure prominently into the access/utilization
calculus.

B. LIMITATIONS BASED ON RACE AND ETHNICITY
Disparities in the access and quality of health care in the U.S. along racial and ethnic lines
are sadly but ably well-documented. In 2003, the Institute of Medicine released a report entitled,
AUnequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care,@ documenting
differences in health status, available treatment and clinical outcomes along racial and ethnic
lines.73 The IOM report summarized data from over 100 studies addressing racial differences in
71

See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 2 (Jan. 2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451.pdf#search=%22percentage%20of%20americans%20health%2
0insured%20through%20employer%22.
72

Professor Michele Goodwin cogently warns that the link between employment and access to
ART creates a double bind for women in the workplace, especially professional women whose superiors
place subtle pressure on younger women to defer childbearing to increase their chances of Afair@
opportunities at law firms, businesses, or university posts. ART is seen as a technological bail out for
women who put off childbearing, thus encouraging continued participation in the workplace. Pregnancy
and motherhood discrimination, Professor Goodwin argues, are soft but real discrimination that create
Adouble binds@ for women who believe they must choose between career and early motherhood. Michele
Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory Choice of Motherhood, 9
J. GENDER, RACE AND JUSTICE 1 (2005). The existence of the double bind does not alter the reality that
women who require ART, whether because of a voluntary deferral of childbearing or an earlier diagnosis
of infertility, are better off in a workplace that provides health insurance, including coverage for ART.
Professor Goodwin acknowledges this reality, but insists that if the mere promise of that benefit, should it
be necessary, keeps women in the workplace longer, it should be regarded as a mistaken equitable
accommodation that ultimately harms women and their families. Id. at 2.
73

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, UNEQUAL TREATMENT CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 80-214 (2003). After controlling for
differences among the races in socioeconomic status, health insurance, access to health care and
geographic differences, the evidence still shows that Blacks and Latinos receive fewer and inferior clinical
services than whites, irrespective of whether those services are for treatment of cardiovascular disease,
cancers, mental illness, pre-natal care or HIV/AIDS. Dayna Bowen Matthew, A New Strategy to Combat
Racial Inequality in American Health Care Delivery, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 793, 794 (2006).
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health care, collectively and definitely concluding that racial and ethnic disparities are consistent
and extensive across a range of medical conditions and healthcare services.74 These disparities
likewise infect access and treatment in ART, but like the field itself are only beginning to be
seriously evaluated.
For about the last decade, commentators have highlighted the disparities in the use of and
access to ART services for women of color compared to white women.75 Recent research
confirms disparities in both the incidence of infertility and the utilization of fertility treatments
among women of different races. To begin, Hispanic women and non-Hispanic black and otherrace women are significantly more likely to be infertile than white women.76 Yet despite higher
incidence of infertility, women of color are far less likely to seek treatment than white women.77
Part of the reason for lower utilization relates to disparities in insurance coverage B 33% of
Hispanics and 20% of blacks lack health insurance, compared to 11% of whites. As a result of
these insurance disparities, according to several public health researchers, AART remains a
private, fee-for-service form of health care delivery in the United States, accessible largely to
white, middle- to upper-class infertile couples.@78
This Astratified reproduction@ has been described as a Aeugenic logic of IVF@ because the
74

IOM REPORT, supra note 73, at 79.
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See. e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
935 (1996).
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According to the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), infertility is higher among
married couples where the wife is non-white, compared to couples in which the wife is white. The
incidence of infertility is highest, 13.6%, among married women categorized as Anon-Hispanic other@, a
group that includes Asian, Pacific Islander, Alaskan Native, and American Indian women. Infertility
among non-Hispanic black women is 10.5 percent, compared to the 7.0 and 6.4 infertility rate among
Hispanic and non-Hispanic white women, respectively. See National Survey of Family Growth, supra note
12.
The reasons for infertility disparities along racial lines is explained by Drs. Marcia Inhorn and
Michael Hassan Fakih in their work comparing fertility rates among whites, on the one hand, and Arab
Americans and African Americans on the other hand. They report Aboth groups are likely at increased risk
for infertility problems because of environmental and lifestyle factors. Both groups tend to be concentrated
in urban industrial centers, where they are exposed to reproductive toxins, particularly lead, through
occupational exposures, ambient air pollution, and toxic waste disposal in their neighborhoods. In addition
their infertility problems might be linked to lifestyle factors, including heavy smoking, caffeine
consumption, and drug use, as well as nutritional deficiencies and female obesity, which disrupts
ovulation.@ See Inhorn & Fakih, supra note 36 , at 845-46.
77

See White & McQuillan, supra note 34.
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See Inhorn & Fakih, supra note 36.
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cost barriers to ART services disparately impact low-income women who are disproportionately
nonwhite.79 The plight of infertile low-income and racial and ethnic minority individuals to
access infertility treatment may be further aggravated by social, structural, and ideological
barriers to effective medical care. Several recent studies shed light on these factors, as they
document the experience of non-whites in navigating the health care system in general and the
provision of ART services in particular. In one look at access to reproductive services by Arab
and African Americans, researchers note that both communities regard the U.S. health system
with some degree of suspicion and distrust, based on past experiences of racism and
discrimination. Moreover, caricatures of these two groups produce images of males as
hypersexual and women as hyperfertile.80 Such stereotyping in these groups can lead Ato the
convenient denial of their legitimate reproductive health needs.@81
One source of hope for reducing racial and ethnic disparities in access to ART looks to
state insurance mandates, with the aspiration that at least one group of patients B those with
insurance B will have equal access, and thus equal utilization of fertility treatments. But hope
fades some when studies show that racial and ethnic disparities in utilization remain unchanged
even when insurance coverage is mandated. In Massachusetts, for example, a state with a
comprehensive mandate to provide infertility services, disparities in access to infertility treatment
continue to exist along racial and ethnic lines.82 Clearly research is needed to understand the
structural and psychological barriers to care that impact disproportionately on minority
populations.
Recently, the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development announced that
one of its goals is the support of research on the factors leading to infertility among minority men
and women and the reasons for lower levels of use of infertility services in minority
populations.83 For health science researches, studying the microcosm of infertility could yield
insights into racial and ethnic health disparities in general. But for now, what we do know is that
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barriers to ART based on the racial and ethnic background of the patient are a reality. While we
don=t yet understand all the causes of racial and ethnic disparities in accessing ART, we have
identified at least some of the internal and external contributing factors.
Outside, or external, factors that impede minority access to ART include lower
socioeconomic status as a group compared to nonminority populations, which results in lower
levels of health care coverage, including coverage for ART, as well as lower discretionary
income to pay for reproductive services.84 In addition, research reveals that racial stereotyping
among practitioners can cause minorities to refrain from seeking services.85 If the nonminority
community in general, and the ART providers in particular (the majority of whom are
nonminority) perceive minority women as hyperfertile and minority men as hypersexual, the
projection of this caricature could be immensely intimidating for minority patients.
Internal factors include a general distrust of the health care system in general, based on a
long history of documented racism.86 This history, according to researchers, inspires a lack of
trust on the part of minority women in their health care providers to deal with their reproductive
complaints effectively and without prejudice.87 If minority women anticipate a physician will
respond to their infertility by either subtly or explicitly suggesting women of certain racial and
ethnic backgrounds do not Aneed@ to birth any more children, one can understand why this subset
of the infertile would shy away from seeking treatment. In addition, researchers have suggested
that cultural barriers impede treatment-seeking by African American women. Professor Dorothy
Roberts reports one black woman=s reaction to her infertility: A[b]eing African-American, I felt
that we=re fruitful people and it was shameful to have this problem.@88 Such a perception of
infertility as a fault-based condition could Ainfluence not only the decision to seek treatment, but
84
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also the assessment of the need for treatment by clinicians.@89
The law=s ability to respond to these internal and external factors is decidedly weak.
Various federal and state civil rights statutes prohibit discrimination against potential patients on
the basis of a host of factors, including race. Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits physicians and hospitals receiving federal funding from discriminating in the provision
of health care on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin.90 States have likewise
enacted laws prohibiting racial discrimination in health care.91 But a review of case law confirms
that attempts to address racial discrimination in health care via traditional civil rights litigation
under existing statutory schemes have proved frustrating for private individuals who often must
show intentional discrimination on the part of the health care provider.92 In a recent article,
Professor Dayna Matthew describes the history of health care civil rights litigation under Title VI
of the1964 Civil Rights Act as Asingularly ineffective in addressing certain well-known forms of
persistent health care inequalities.@93
In the ART arena, scholars have largely shunned litigation as a remedy to address racial
inequities in the delivery of assisted conception services, recognizing the futility of such an
approach. If plaintiffs have largely failed to prevail in cases dealing with the provision of basic
medical services, where documented disparities clearly exist, pursuing a case against a provider
for refusing to provide what is often viewed as discretionary services seems daunting. Never
mind meeting the burden of proving intentional discrimination with anything less than a
Asmoking gun@ admission of racial bias. Instead of litigation, ART watchers suggest that the
infertility industry become more patient-friendly to racial and ethnic minorities by, for example,
lobbying to increase insurance coverage for ART services, locating fertility clinics in more
diverse neighborhoods, and increasing public awareness in minority communities about
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infertility and its treatment.94 Whether these or other measures will help lower racial and ethnic
barriers to ART is an open question, but the seriousness of such reduced access cannot be
overstated in a society that values equality and reproductive freedom for all.

C. LIMITATIONS BASED ON MARITAL STATUS
Solid data about the percentage of ART patients who are unmarried is difficult to procure,
as the national reporting system for assisted conception does not collect demographic
information on ART users other than age.95 What we do know is that single women are giving
birth in record numbers. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, in 2005 36.8%
of all births in the U.S. were to unmarried women.96 Statistics about the number of these
unmarried women who sought infertility services is largely unavailable, with the exception of
informal and anecdotal reports which peg the percentage of single women using one type of
assisted conception B artificial insemination by donor (AID) B at approximately one third of all
users.97
Both AID and IVF offer unmarried individuals B with and without partners B
opportunities for parenthood they simply could not achieve on their own. IVF, for example,
offers lesbian couples the opportunity to co-create a child. If both women wish to contribute to
the reproductive process, one women can supply the egg (the genetic mother) and the other can
gestate the fetus (the birth mother). For male singletons and couples, ART is an absolute
necessity to procreation, supplying both the egg and the womb to conceive and gestate the child.
But such technological capabilities will be meaningful only if unmarried individuals have
ample access to ART. While access to treatment for unmarried individuals can be hampered by
the same cost and racial barriers that plague ART access in general, single women and same sex
couples face reduced access from at least two additional sources B provider discrimination
against single and gay women and legislative efforts to ban access to unmarried individuals.
Published cases of provider discrimination against single women and lesbian couples are
few, but recent research suggests such conduct is widespread. In a study conducted by
researchers at the University of Pennsylvania, survey results show that one in five treatment
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providers refuse treatment to unmarried women.98 Whether such refusal is actionable as
unlawful discrimination will probably depend upon the law of the state where the treatment was
refused. A recent California tale may be representative. In North Coast Women=s Care Medical
Group v. Superior Court,99 Guadalupe Benitez sued the defendant medical group and two of its
physicians for refusing to provide her artificial insemination because she was a
lesbian. She and her partner of 15 years tried to conceive for several years using selfinsemination techniques, but when Ms. Benitez required intrauterine inseminations (IUI), a more
invasive reproductive technology,100 the North Coast doctors refused saying it was against their
religious beliefs to provide such services to the plaintiff.
The facts are disputed as to whether the doctors claimed the religious objection on the
basis of the patient=s sexual orientation (the state=s antidiscrimination law prohibits
discrimination in the provision of medical services on the basis of sexual orientation) or on the
basis of the patient=s marital status (surprisingly, at the time the lawsuit was filed, California law
did permit physicians to refuse treatment on the basis of a patient=s marital status). Even though
the California Supreme Court ruled in early 2005 that lawsuits could be filed alleging
discrimination on the basis of marital status,101 and the legislature enacted a law expressly
prohibiting discrimination in the state on the basis of marital status,102 the Court of Appeal ruled
in April 2006 that since both the supreme court case and the statutory change occurred after Ms.
Benitez filed her lawsuit, these measures did not apply retroactively. Thus, the case will proceed
to trial to determine whether the doctors refused treatment on the basis of marital status or sexual
orientation.103
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In states in which medical antidiscrimination laws are either silent or ambiguous with
respect to marital status or sexual orientation as protected categories, unmarried individuals may
face impregnable barriers to access. Moreover, even if state law does prohibit discrimination on
the basis of marital status or sexual orientation, presumably a provider could argue that ART
services are not Amedical services@ as defined by the relevant statutes, and thus not covered
services. We earlier noted the consensus among courts that infertility is a Amedical illness@ but it
does not necessarily follow that its treatment will always be considered a medical service.104
This battle of the medicalization of ART services has been waged in the health insurance arena,
with courts varying widely on whether infertility treatment should be considered medical
treatment in the litigated context.105 Perhaps discrimination law will borrow from insurance law
should these cases present in this fashion.
In addition to provider discrimination, unmarried individuals may be facing an
increasingly hostile statutory environment, as lawmakers in several states attempt to limit ART to
married individuals.106 In late 2005 and early 2006, legislators in Indiana and Virginia,
respectively, introduced legislation that would prohibit health care providers from offering or
performing any medical procedure on an unmarried woman for the purpose of conception or
procreation. The Indiana bill, introduced by State Senator Patricia Miller (R-Indianapolis) in
October 2005, would have required that couples who seek assistance to become pregnant, such as
through IUI, donor eggs, sperm and embryos, IVF or Aother medical means@ would have to be
married to each other. While the Senator ultimately dropped the bill, its mere introduction
caused alarm among those who favor equal access to ART regardless of marital status.107

104

See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. In addition, state antidiscrimination laws generally
apply to full and equal access to accommodations and services in all business establishments of every kind.
See. e.g., Cal. Civ. Code '51 (the Unruh Civil Rights Act). Thus, for a provider to argue that ART is not
a medical service for unmarrieds when it is being offered without barrier to married couples is an absurdity
that only serves to prove the discriminatory conduct at issue.
105

See supra note 39.

106

One particular form of ART B gestational services B is already limited to married couples in
two states, Florida and Texas. Florida law provides, AA contract for gestational surrogacy shall not be
binding and enforceable unless...the commissioning couple are legally married and are both 18 years of age
or older.@ Fla. Stat. Ann. '742.15(1) (West 2005). Presumably this law, and a similar requirement in
Texas, Tex. Code Ann., Family Code '160.754(b) (West 2005), would void any surrogacy contract
entered into a by single individual or a same-sex couple. While access to surrogacy by single and same-sex
parents is not prohibited, the enforceability of any gestational agreement is seriously called into question by
the prevailing laws.
107

See Mary Beth Schneider, Assisted Reproduction Bill Dropped, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 6, 2005
(Sen. Miller is quoted upon dropping the bill, AThe issue has become more complex than anticipated.@).

29

A similar bill was introduced into the Virginia Legislature in January 2006. Virginia
House Bill 187 provides in relevant part:
No individual licensed by a health regulatory board shall assist with or perform any
intervening medical technology, whether in vivo or in vitro, for or on an unmarried
woman that completely or partially replaces sexual intercourse as the means of
conception, including, but not limited to, artificial insemination by donor,
cryopreservation of gametes and embryos, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, gamete
intrafallopian tube transfer, and low tubal ovum transfer.
Read literally, this bill could mean that if a single woman develops cancer and seeks to have her
eggs or a portion of her ovary cryopreserved, a Virginia doctor would risk loss of a medical
license by assisting this patient. Such a doctor would be cryopreserving gametes for an
unmarried woman for purposes of [future] conception. True, the patient might be married when
she thaws the gametes, but certainly the statute can be read to prohibit cryopreservation for single
individuals. Perhaps because of this scenario, or perhaps because of opposition in general, the
bill was passed by indefinitely (essentially dropped) by the Committee on Health, Welfare and
Institutions two weeks after it was introduced.108
These proposed generalized marital status restrictions may have dodged enactment for
now, but ART barriers based on marital status are in place in several states. In two states, for
example, only married couples may enter into valid, enforceable contracts for gestational
surrogacy services. In Texas and Florida, contracts for gestational surrogacy are enforceable only
if the commissioning couple is legally married.109 Such a requirement translates into an
automatic exclusion of single men and same sex male couples from ART, who must turn to
gestational surrogacy to achieve biologic parenthood. Thus, the chief form of family formation
for unmarried males is explicitly unavailable in two of our most populous states.
In addition to these specific ART exclusions based on marital (and by extension sexual
orientation) status, another recent bill would de facto reduce access to assisted conception for
unmarried women. Another Virginia bill introduced in 2006 would require that all unrelated
gamete donors be identified in a woman=s medical chart.110 Though the proposed bill appears
108

2006 Va. H.B. 187. The legality of this bill is seriously challenged by the Virginia Human
Rights Act, Va. Code Ann. '2.2-3900, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status in
places of public accommodation. If a physician=s office is considered a place of public accommodation,
the new law would run afoul of existing protections for unmarried women.
109

See Tex. Code Ann., Family Code '160.754(b) (West 2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. '742.15(1) (West

2006).
110

See Va. H.B. 412 (2006), requiring the identity of all gamete donors be written in a woman
patient=s chart when used in connection with assisted conception.

30

facially neutral in terms of the marital status of the woman patient, in fact it would have the most
dramatic impact on single and lesbian women. Experience in other countries confirms that
mandating donor identity significantly reduces the number of donors willing to provide
gametes.111 Thus, a non-anonymous donor policy in the U.S. would reduce the availability of
donor sperm for unmarried women, the vast majority of whom rely on commercial sperm banks
to fulfill their procreative dreams.
In sum, current barriers to ART access can be categorized according to six factors: direct
barriers, indirect barriers, formal acts, informal acts, intentional acts and unintentional acts.
Cross-cataloguing these factors gives a broad overview of the types of conduct that impair an
infertile person=s opportunity to reproduce. Table 2 displays examples of the various barriers
discussed herein, according to whether the barrier is direct (a bar to service) or indirect (a
deterrent to service), and whether the conduct giving rise to the barrier is formal (enacted law),
informal (private conduct), intentional or unintentional. What is striking about Table 2 is the
range and depth of the panoply of access barriers. Each barrier, whatever its origin, no less
grieves the affected populations by depriving them a highly prized and revered right. Harms
from lack of ART access are as deep and diverse as the barriers themselves, and it to these harms
we now turn.
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Donor tracing schemes exist in Sweden (which resultingly prompt single women to routinely
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Table 2. A Catalogue of ART Barriers

Formal Act

Direct Barrier

Indirect Barrier

State laws banning
ART to unmarrieds

Laws requiring
identification of
gamete donors
(creating severe
shortages of available
donor gametes)

State laws limiting
commercial
surrogacy to married
couples
Informal Act

Physician groups and
individual providers
who refuse service to
unmarrieds

Past discriminatory
practices by health
care providers
chilling treatmentseeking behavior by
racial and ethnic
minorities

Intentional Act

State lawmakers and
employers unwilling
to offer fertility
treatment as covered
health care benefit

Locating the majority
of ART clinics in
mostly urban and
coastal areas

The high cost of
ART services

Lower
socioeconomic status
and levels of
employment among
racial and ethnic
minorities compared
to nonminorities

Unintentional Act
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IV. MEASURING HARMS
Access barriers to ART services affects four main groups B patients, providers, children
and society. Depriving an individual the right to procreate, or creating a substantial obstacle to
the exercise of that right, is as much an affront to the affected individual as it is to the other
cohorts that comprise the ART world. While at first blush it may appear that barriers to ART
access are visited only upon those clamoring for assisted conception services, the import and
significance of procreation to our collective well-being means that deprivation of reproductive
services casts a long shadow across a large swath of our society.
Notably, many of the barriers to assistance in reproduction cluster along demographic
lines, impacting would-be parents on the basis of their socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity and
marital status. Such stratification of reproductive freedom leaves one to wonder whether current
ART barriers are descendants of our eugenics past? In early 20th century American life, a
powerful eugenics movement advanced the concept that certain social ills could be cured through
selective breeding, thus leading the way for forced sterilization laws to be passed in more than 30
states.112 Clearly ART barriers do not force sterilization, but they may serve as commentary on
the social worth of certain prospective parents. Such commentary, and its clinical effects of
suppressing ART treatment-seeking, inflict indelible harms on a host of individuals and
associated ART-related groups, as explored below.

A. HARM TO ART PATIENTS
As human beings, in the main we have a natural inclination to reproduce and to value the
products of our reproductive efforts. Ask virtually any parent about the relative value of his or
her life experiences and you will hear, AThe most significant and meaningful thing I have done in
my life is parent my child(ren).@ Because of the central importance of procreation to the human
112

See Lisa Powell, Eugenics and Equality: Does the Constitution Allow Policies Designed to
Discourage Reproduction Among Disfavored Groups?, 20 YALE LAW & POLICY REV. 481, 483 (2002),
citing Harry Laughlin, MODEL EUGENICAL STERILIZATION LAW, IN EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE
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CHICAGO 445, 447 (1922). Between 1900 and 1963, at least 60,000 Americans were sterilized pursuant to
eugenic sterilization laws. In response to a lawsuit, in 1974 the federal government adopted regulations
banning sterilization without consent in hospitals that receive federal funds, but reports of violations
surface periodically. For a thorough discussion of the eugenics movement and its impact on current ART
dialogue, see Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics
PastBPresent, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125 (2003).
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experience, denial of this opportunity, either through refractory infertility or government
restrictions on ART, strikes at the core of how one sees oneself and one=s place in the world. As
phrased by Professor John Robertson, Areproductive experiences...are central to personal
conceptions of meaning and identity. To deny procreative choice is to deny or impose a crucial
self-defining experience, thus denying persons respect and dignity at the most basic level.@113
The experience of being denied access to lawful means of reproductive assistance is equally
devastating, knowing that the means of biologic parenthood are at hand but feeling the wrench of
denial of those services based on personal characteristics largely outside of one=s control. The
harms to prospective ART patients from lack of treatment access impact on human well-being in
a variety of ways, ranging from measurable financial burdens to more ethereal but no less
haunting dignitary harms. Since prospective patients are on the front line of treatment denials,
the harms are felt most acutely by those denied the fundamental right to reproduce.

1. FORCED CHILDLESSNESS
Individuals who confront reduced or restricted access to ART may resign themselves to a
life without children, suppressing or managing their feelings of disappointment and
worthlessness that often accompany unresolved infertility. The prospect of childlessness from
reduced or denied ART treatment can provoke a range of responses from the affected individuals,
depending upon the basis for the curtailed access. In some instances, the reaction to treatment
denials may be to seek alternative routes to parenthood; in others, infertiles may withdraw
entirely from a health care system that has utterly failed to meet their reproductive needs.
Perhaps the most obvious alternative to ART is adoption. Infertiles denied access to
ART, particularly those who face barriers based on the high cost of services, may turn to
adoption. As described by Professor Ellen Waldman, there are at least two routes to adoption,
public agency adoption and private /independent adoption, with cost representing one of the main
differences between the two.114 Public agency adoption places children who come into the care
of the state, often via parental abandonment or abuse and neglect. Agency adoption can be
relatively low cost (compared to the cost of IVF), and thus can offer parenthood to couples who
are financially unable to access ART. The drawback, however, is that the demand for healthy
infants far exceeds the supply, forcing eligible couples to endure long waits for a much-wanted
child. Moreover, state agencies often limit placement of infants to married couples, thus shutting
out single and same sex couples from this adoption process.115
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Adoption through a private agency or independently is legal is most states, and involves
only a lawyer or physician as an intermediary between the pregnant woman (or parent of an
existing child) and the adoptor(s). However, all private agencies have their own requirements
regarding age, marital status and income that may exclude, for example, couples of lower
socioeconomic status, older single women, or same sex couples. Additionally, private adoptions
can be as expense as IVF, ranging in cost from $10,000 to $25,000, a prohibitory expense that
may have knocked a prospective parent out of the ART arena in the first place. Finally, laws in
several states prohibit same sex couples from adopting children, thus imposing a secondary
barrier to parenthood for this select group of infertiles.116
In the end, adoption offers only a limited reprieve from ART denials to a select group of
infertiles B mostly married couples whose income is sufficiently high to meet wealth
requirements, but not high enough to afford the staggering cost of infertility treatment. Both
practice and law reveal that adoption is not widely available to many of the individuals and
couples who are shut out of the ART arena for reasons of race, marital status, and sexual
orientation. The ineligibility of older single women, same-sex couples, and racial and ethnic
minorities of lower socioeconomic status, coupled with the scarcity of adoptable children, is
hardly a recipe for combating the devastating harm of forced childlessness engendered by barriers
to ART.

2. UNDUE BURDENS ON PROCREATION
The Supreme Court decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma remains the only high court
precedent to consider the right to procreate as an affirmative, intentional act.117 Every other case
Id.
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to come before the Court in the realm of reproduction has involved the right to avoid procreation,
either through the use of contraceptives or abortion.118 Taken as a whole, Professor John
Robertson describes this body of case law as giving rise to Aprocreative liberty,@ defined as Aa
negative right against state interference with choices to procreate or to avoid procreation.@119
Logically, it follows that procreative liberty is not a Apositive right to have the state or particular
persons provide the means or resources necessary to have or avoid having children@ but merely
the right to be left alone by the state in pursuit of reproductive choices.120 Thus, the meaning and
viability of procreative liberty, like any constitutional right, derives from a cadre of cases raising
challenges to governmental actions that arguably impact a protected right. In the modern era,
comprehensive judicial discussion of the fundamental right to procreative liberty is embedded in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,121 the Court=s 1992 abortion
decision.
In Casey, the Court began by confirming that the constitutional protection of a woman=s
decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.122 The language extolling that no State shall Adeprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law@ gives rise to the procreative liberty at stake in the abortion
context. This liberty, the Court explained, is not absolute but must be balanced against the
State=s legitimate interest in the life of the unborn. Thus, the Court formulated a legal standard
for evaluating state regulation of elective abortion, weighing the woman=s liberty interest against
the government=s interest in potential life. State abortion regulation, the Court declared, will be
invalid if it poses an Aundue burden@ on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. An
undue burden exists, Aif its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.@123
constitutionality of Georgia sodomy statute as applied to homosexual conduct, later overturned in
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)).
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The undue burden test remains the centerpiece of the Court= abortion jurisprudence,
though the high court has taken precious little opportunity to elucidate on exactly when state
action constitutes an undue burden on a woman=s reproductive liberty.124 But the concept of
undue burdens and procreative liberty need not be limited to the abortion context. Arguably, this
same procreative liberty that attaches to a decision to choose or refrain from obtaining an
abortion, likewise applies to a decision to actively engage in procreation. If this logical inference
is sound, then state action that impacts on the decision to procreate can likewise be evaluated
under the undue burden analysis. Imagine, for example, that the undue burden test was the
reigning analysis in 1942 when the Court in Skinner evaluated the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal
Sterilization Act, which authorized state officials to sexually sterilize certain convicted felons.
We can have a great deal of confidence that Justice Douglas would have found the law to pose an
undue burden on the right to procreate.
Thankfully the era of state-sponsored sterilization is in the past, so directed measures that
prohibit or prevent individual procreation would seem to be of historic interest only. But as
discussed in Part III, there remain numerous barriers to one type of procreation - reproduction
using assisted conception. The question for constitutional purposes is whether any of these
barriers rise to the level of state action and if so whether they pose an undue burden on
procreation. As for the question of state action, the barriers arising from wealth status,
employment, race and ethnicity seem unrelated to governmental activity in that no laws appear to
directly prevent access to ART on any of these bases. But the two proposed laws limiting ART
to married individuals clearly rise to the level of state action. Moreover, such laws, by design,
pose an undue burden on the rights of unmarrieds to procreate.
Recall that the proposed Virginia law prohibits physicians from performing Aany
intervening medical technology, whether in vivo or in vitro, for or on an unmarried woman that
completely or partially replaces sexual intercourse as the means of conception.@125 The notion of
singling out unmarried individuals for disparate treatment in the realm of reproduction was longago shunned by the Supreme Court. In a 1972 case striking down a state law prohibiting, inter
alia, the distribution of contraceptives to single people, Justice Brennan penned the oft-quoted
124
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admonition, A[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child@126 A law that prevents an
infertile single woman from accessing safe and effective assistance in reproduction is a clear
affront to her Aright to privacy,@ a right which today is framed in terms of the above-described
procreative liberty interest. Depriving a single person access to reproductive assistance which is
readily available to married individuals seems unlikely to serve any state interest, let alone a
compelling state interest needed to justify infringement on the fundamental right to procreate.127
State laws that deprive unmarried individuals access to ART seem ripe for invalidation
under the Constitution on deprivation of liberty grounds, but what of discriminatory policies that
are the product of private conduct? Denial of ART services to unmarried individuals has been
documented and reported in the U.S., with a full 20% of fertility clinics refusing to accept single
women, and 53% refusing to accept single men, as patients.128 A lesbian woman in California,
Guadalupe Benitez, became a victim of one such discriminatory policy when she sought AID
services at a San Diego fertility clinic. The clinic, North Coast Woman=s Care Medical Group,
the only ART provider listed on Ms. Benitez=s health plan, refused to provide her services
because she was unmarried.129 This refusal policy was adopted by all of the ART providers at
North Coast, prompting Ms. Benitez to search for an Aoff plan@ provider, whom she eventually
located and proceeded to give birth to a healthy boy.130
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While North Coast is a private health clinic and thus would probably not be considered a
state actor for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, it is important nevertheless to
consider whether the clinic=s Ano singles@ policy posed an undue burden on Ms. Benitez and the
universe of single individuals who routinely and by necessity seek assistance in reproduction.
Put simply, do policies limiting ART services to married individuals pose an undue burden on
the rights of unmarried individuals to exercise their fundamental right to procreate? The answer
is unequivocally yes. Consider the following three burdens imposed by marital status
discrimination in the ART market.
First, single individuals who access ART services via their health insurance plans will be
forced to incur additional and out of pocket expenses if the plan providers refuse service on the
basis of marital status. Such was the case with Guadalupe Benitez, who eventually sought
treatment from an Aout of plan@ physician, at substantially greater cost than continuing treatment
with North Coast would have posed.131 In addition to denying treatment and forcing Ms. Benetiz
outside the health plan, North Coast refused to reimburse its patient for the added expense
imposed on her by its refusal to provide service. Despite these setbacks, Ms. Benitez was
fortunate in at least two ways B she had the resources to fully fund her treatment and she resided
in an area with a relatively large number of ART providers.132
The economic burden on Adisqualified@ patients who rely on their health insurance
coverage for all their medical needs, including their reproductive needs, cannot be ignored. It is
certainly possible that Ms. Benitez or myriad other unmarried individuals selected their job, or
even their domicile, on the basis of the proferred health care plan. A person who selects a job, or
a health plan, in reliance on its availability for covered services suffers unduly from being forced
to seek and individually bankroll ART treatment. Since policies regarding marital status are
generally not formalized by ART clinics, there is simply no notice to single individuals that they
are disqualified from receiving service, either when they select a health plan or when they visit a
covered clinic for treatment.133 Such lack of notice and hidden selectivity forces single
individuals to search out alternate providers, possibly incurring additional expenses for travel or
time away from work, adding to their already unanticipated economic burden.
A second burden that befalls unmarried individuals who are denied treatment based on
their marital status is the involuntary foray into fertility tourism. If a prospective parent lives in
an area in which the only, or all of the ART clinics have adopted a Ano singles@ policy, the patient
will be forced to travel, possible great distances, to seek out care. The economic burden of this
131
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forced travel is obvious, but there are psychological and emotional costs as well. Leaving one=s
home, one=s job, one=s partner, one=s family, to pursue a quest that itself poses physical and
mental challenges disproportionately burdens unmarried individuals compared to their married
counterparts. While some commentators have downplayed the burden of rejection, remarking
that patients can Asimply go elsewhere,@134 such callousness wholly discounts the realities of
ART treatment. In at least six states, there is only one ART clinic, making distance travel a
necessity should the single in-state clinic choose to turn away unmarried individuals.135
Moreover, this travel burden may be heaped on top of the economic burden from having to pay
for Aout of plan@ services, since a health plan is unlikely to cover an out-of-state ART clinic.
A final burden that treatment denials impose on patients who are refused treatment based
on their marital status is a lasting and negative impact on the long-term health of the targeted
population. While this observation could apply generally to any targeted population, it has been
studied and documented in the lesbian population. According to a study conducted by a Stanford
University researcher, lesbian patients experience widespread sexual orientation bias by health
care providers, shutting down critical communication between patient and physician and driving
gay women away from the medical system. As a result, this population experiences greater
incidence of illness because they reduce Atheir utilization of standard screening modalities,
potentially resulting in higher morbidity and mortality from cancers and heart disease.@136 A
sister researcher at UCLA concurs, finding Aresearch has repeatedly documented that lesbians
report frequent negative encounters in health care settings, including inappropriate interventions,
hostility from providers, and violation of confidentiality.@137
Treatment denials for ART on the basis of marital status are uniquely and profoundly
damaging to patients. Medically qualified individuals are denied a particular type of treatment
134
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strictly because of their social structure. And while doctors do withhold treatment based on the
social status of patient, these treatment denials are based on poor medical outcomes, such as
rejection of an intravenous drug user for solid organ transplantation. Denying a person the
opportunity for parenthood only magnifies the emotional and psychological trauma that is already
associated with infertility. Feelings of worthlessness, withdrawal, alienation, and self-doubt can
only mount in the face of a direct attack on a person=s worthiness to contribute another member
of the human race. After such an affront, it is no surprise that members of the targeted
population would retreat from the medical system altogether, risking their health and ultimately
their lives.
The burdens of ART treatment denials pose short-term economic and long-term physical
and psychological injury to individuals whose ability to parent rests largely in the hands of
physician providers. The affront to personhood is especially grave when one considers that no
similar screening mechanism exists for natural conception. Prospective parents whom society
may adjudge Aunfit@ because of their social interactions are free to procreate without interference
by the State or private actors.138 They live under the Abasic civil rights of man@ deemed so
essential by Justice Douglas generations ago. Surely the substantial obstacles to choice eschewed
when a woman decides whether to terminate a pregnancy should likewise be banished when any
individual embarks upon the pathway to parenthood.

3. DIGNITARY HARMS
Embedded in our nation=s tradition of protecting individual civil rights is a recognition
that denial of equal access to public goods on the basis of immutable characteristics is an affront
to personal dignity. Recognition of this sentiment was codified in Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which provides in relevant part:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.139
138
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Almost immediately after passage of the Act, in Heart of Atlanta v. U.S., the Supreme
Court affirmed both the wisdom and constitutionality of Title II as a legitimate legislative effort
to Avindicate the >deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access
to public establishments.=@140 The Court observed that laws prohibiting discrimination in public
accommodations Aeliminate [the] evil@ of businesses serving only those Aas they see fit,@ which
demeans both the individual and society as a whole.141
From a litigation strategy perspective, one might want to explore whether ART clinics are
Apublic accommodations@ under the Civil Rights Act (they probably are not)142 or other federal
laws (they probably are),143 such that treatment denials are actionable civil rights offenses
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(probably only if the claim arises on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin).144
But from a policy perspective the more salient inquiry is whether intentional withholding of ART
services on the basis of personal characteristics works a deprivation of personal dignity. I believe
that it does.
The provision of ART services is at its heart a medical activity in which physicians
control and patients seek the technical means to procreate. Central to the provision of
reproductive medical services is the patient=s right to decide whether to accept or reject a
proferred treatment, after due consideration of the risks and benefits attendant to a given
modality. Both common law and bioethics principles have long acknowledged the preeminence
of patient autonomy and respect for persons in the arena of medical decision-making B and
nothing suggests these values would not extent to decision-making surrounding assisted
conception. Such values, bioethicists argue, also support recognizing the dignitary rights of
patients B rights that arise in the health care setting independent of physical injury and even
emotional distress.145 Dignitary rights arise from a patient=s common law right of selfdetermination in medical decision-making, a century-old right first described by Judge Cardozo
in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital.146 As explained by Professor Richard Saver,
A[t]his common law right safeguards not only patients= physical health but also arguably advances
their intrinsic worth as independent moral agents.@147
Borrowing from Professor Saver=s language, the act of procreating can certainly be
described as an activity that advances one=s intrinsic worth as an independent moral agent.
Deciding whether and when to create another life, a life that takes on one=s genetic traits and
social history, is deeply tied to one=s sense of self and place in the world - i.e., one=s intrinsic
worth. Those in the fertile community can exercise their positive right to reproduce as
independent moral agents, free from interference by state or private actors (other than intimate
partners whose parenting prospects may also be at stake). The infertile, on the other hand, are
not generally free to make independent procreative decisions, as their choices must be vetted by
144
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those who hold the means to procreation. The fortuity of infertility creates in the hands of ART
providers an awesome power that would otherwise rest solely with the individual. Abuse or
misuse of that power works not just a deprivation of parenthood, but a deprivation of the human
dignity that is at the root of procreative decision-making.148
Dignitary harms are particularly acute when treatment denials are based on personal
characteristics, rather than personal circumstances. The barriers to ART discussed in Part III fall
into these two categories. Race and ethnicity, and marital status, are examples of personal
characteristics, while wealth and employment status are better categorized as personal
circumstances. Both federal and state civil rights laws recognize the invidious nature of
characteristic-based discrimination, prohibiting conduct that is motivated by fear, or hatred, or
stereotyping, of individuals who bear the protected qualities.
In many instances, state civil rights laws offer broader protection to individuals than are
available under federal law. For example, in the context of housing discrimination, the
California fair housing law protects against discrimination on the basis of Arace, color, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, ancestry, familial status, source of income
or disability,@149 whereas the federal Fair Housing Act provides no protection against sexual
orientation, marital status, or source of income discrimination.150 The provision of rental
housing, like the provision of ART services, is often at the mercy of third party providers
(landlord/physician). Thus, a case about the limitations on denying benefits on the basis of
personal characteristics may be instructive.
In Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission,151 a California landlord refused
to lease property to a cohabitating unmarried couple because she Abelieves that sex outside of
marriage is sinful, and that it is a sin for her to rent her units to people who will engage in
nonmarital sex on her property.@152 She claimed protection under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution which guards against state interference with freedom of religious
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exercise.153 The California Supreme Court rejected the landlord=s claim, explaining that the right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability. The California housing law was such a law because it prohibits all
discrimination without regard to the actor=s motive, and its objective is to prohibit discrimination
irrespective of the actor=s reason. Even if the actor=s reason is religiously based, the law
measures the act of discrimination, not the stated reasons for such action.154
The California court=s holding that state antidiscrimination laws trump free exercise
objections was based in part on the impact that denial of commercial services has on the rights
and interest of third parties. If a person controls access to public accommodations or necessary
services, permitting that person to discriminate Awould sacrifice the rights of [others] to have
equal access to public accommodations and their legal and dignity interests in freedom from
discrimination based on personal characteristics.@155 In a free market where commercial services
are distributed largely on economic grounds, injecting race or marital status as an eligibility
requirement for acquisition significantly suppresses the ability of those in the target population to
maintain their status as an equal member of the society. Denial of certain services which are
generally available to most can only engender more acts of isolation and deprivation based on
these despised characteristics.
The landlord=s actions in Smith can be likened to an ART physician who objects to
assisting an unmarried couple on similar grounds B aiding a couple to have a child outside of
marriage goes against her religious beliefs. A physician, like a landlord, is a member of a group
that controls access to essential services necessary for human flourishing. These services
(shelter, assistance in procreation) can affect the well-being of the individual denied such
services, and can also impact the well-being of third parties (friends or relatives of homeless
person who may be coerced into providing shelter, partner of prospective parent who is likewise
deprived of procreative opportunities, existing children of rejected patient who may question
their own self-worth). Thus, a person denied essential services suffers the indignity of such
denial, but the concentric circles of harm extend beyond the individual to third parties. This kind
of third party harm is exactly the type of harm the California Supreme Court sought to prevent in
Smith when it elevated antidiscrimination laws over claims of individual religious autonomy.
Even if dignitary harms arising from ART denials gain recognition as legally cognizable
claims, questions remain about the appropriate mechanism for redress and the impact on
physician autonomy. I believe both of these uncertainties can be resolved by codifying existing
153
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anidiscrimination policy statements by physician organizations within the framework of existing
state civil rights laws. For example, the American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics
provides a comprehensive statement of nondiscrimination in the provision of medical services by
licensed physicians:
Physicians who offer their services to the public may not decline to accept patients
because of race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or any other basis that
would constitute invidious discrimination.156
With the exception of marital status discrimination, this statement encircles the bases on which
ART providers might refuse to provide care to an otherwise Aready, willing and able@ patient.
Codifying this prohibition and applying it to ART refusals on the basis of the enumerated
personal characteristics (including marital status) could go a long way toward remedying the
dignitary harms suffered when essential reproductive services are denied. An ART-specific
statute could read:
A physician and surgeon or other health care provider delivering fertility treatment shall
not decline to accept, or incite others to decline to accept, any patient because of race,
color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or marital status.157
Moreover, incorporating a calculus for damages further recognizes and addresses the serious
harm to dignity that results when parenting opportunities are arbitrarily withheld. Borrowing
from existing state laws, violations of a medical-specific antidiscrimination law could be
punishable by monetary damages, such as those described in one state=s law:
Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction
contrary to [the applicable antidiscrimination law] is liable for each and every offense for
the actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting
without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no
case less than [$10,000 - representing the average cost of an ART cycle], and any
attorney's fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any
person denied the rights provided in [the applicable antidiscrimination law].158
Providing monetary damages that are loosely linked to the cost of the sought-after services seems
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a fair solution and a fair penalty for unlawful discrimination in the provision of ART services.
Other solutions might include imposing a duty on physicians to refer patients to a willing
provider, or imposing monetary damages equal to the out-of-pocket losses incurred by patients
who are forced to seek procreative health care outside their health insurance network, or outside
their domicile. But the imposition of treble Aactual damages, and any amount that may be
determined by a@ trier of fact bests other options by expressing the seriousness of the harm
inflicted. Providers who discriminate will incur losses that exceed the cost of Abuying off@ the
patient by sending her to another physician (and paying the differential costs). Moreover,
creating a secondary market of nondiscriminating ART providers only serves to emphasize and
institutionalize the second-class status of those who experience barriers to ART. Separate but
equal is not a value the ART community, or any community, should strive to achieve.

B. HARM TO ART PROVIDERS
The harm visited upon physicians from barriers to ART access are best evaluated in terms
of the nature of the barrier imposed. From the perspective of an ART physician, barriers can be
external or internal. External barriers are those impediments to ART treatment put in place by
third party actors. For example, laws that limit ART treatment to married couples, or health care
policies that fail to provide coverage for assisted conception could be considered external barriers
to ART based, respectively, on marital and wealth status. Internal barriers are those impediments
to ART treatment put in place by providers themselves. Clinic policies that refuse to accept
patients based on race, ethnicy, marital status, family background or sexual orientation would be
examples of internal barriers. It is my contention that practitioners suffer harm from treatment
denials based on both external and internal barriers to ART access.

1. External Barriers: Economic and Reputational Harms
Laws and policy decisions (including those of insurance carriers) that restrict or reduce
patient access to ART can have an obvious effect on the economic well-being of ART providers.
When physicians are barred from assisted certain patients, as would be the case if a Virginiatype bill prohibiting physicians from assisting unmarried women was in force,159 they are
deprived of the potential market generated by these prospective patients. As noted earlier, the
market of single individuals and same sex couples desiring assistance in conception is ample and
growing,160 such that a physician=s inability to tap into that patient population could be
financially devastating. Moreover, decisions among health insurance providers to limit or
withhold coverage for ART could also have a negative impact on provider economic health. At a
minimum, casting fertility services into a Apay to play@ mode limits the number and breadth of
patients a physician encounters, patients who could act as a rich source of referrals and repeat
visits for future health care needs.
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Measuring harms to a provider=s bottom line seems straightforward enough, though it
depends largely on the ability to identify the lost market and calculate the corresponding lost
revenues. Harms to a provider=s reputation as a result of external barriers is far more speculative,
but nevertheless worthy of exploration. It might seem, at first blush, that a law or policy
prohibiting a physician from servicing members of a group would not attract blame to the
provider, but rather to the body propounding such a prohibitory mandate. But physician
compliance with directives that violate societal norms can engender ill-will toward the willing
discriminators. Why, one might wonder, didn=t the physicians object to the imposition of this
mandate as a sign of support for their patients? Why, one might wonder, would providers allow
such restrictions unless they viewed them as permission to act in a desired discriminatory
fashion?
Prospective or even current patients who perceive their physicians= willingness to submit
to exclusionary policies as a sign of endorsement may find themselves among the growing group
of fertility tourists. Outrage, disturbance, or even sister solidarity with their shunned infertile
counterparts could prove harmful to a physician=s reputation, perhaps even decimating her patient
population. Such was the concern among physicians in Sweden who faced a governmentmandated change in the administration of ART services. When Swedish lawmakers abolished
donor anonymity for sperm donors in 1985, a significant number of fertility specialists expressed
their unwillingness to support the new legislation.161 These physicians understood that donors
opposed the law, and would be unlikely to participate in open-identity donation. In addition, the
Swedish physicians also perceived that their patients would prefer a system of donor anonymity,
leaving the decision of disclosure up to each individual parent rather than the state.162 Thus,
instead of working within a system they considered to have serious flaws, these physicians
stopped recruiting sperm donors altogether and referred their patients abroad.
While the Swedish physicians may have been motivated by economic factors (a downturn
in the AID market), their actions are also fairly viewed as an attempt to shore up their
professional integrity among the relevant actors in their ART world. Showing respect for a
patient=s desire for autonomy in her procreative and parental decision-making by providing her
alternatives to existing, restrictive services, can go a ways toward protecting a provider=s
reputation for independence and compassion.
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2. INTERNAL BARRIERS: THE ROLE OF PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY
Physician motivation for refusing to provide medical treatment, including treatment for
infertility, to interested parties derives from the principle of physician autonomy. As noted
earlier, the concept that a physician is free to determine whether or not to enter a doctor/patient
relationship with a prospective patient is embedded in American health law. Professor Furrow
and his colleagues who authored a major textbook in health law describe the principle of
physician autonomy in the context of the doctor/patient relationship as follows:
The traditional legal principle governing the physician-patient relationship is that it is a
voluntary and personal relationship which the physician may choose to enter or not for a
variety of reasons. Legal obligations on the part of providers to furnish care operate as
exceptions to the general rule.163
The exceptions to which Professor Furrow and his colleagues refer are the statutorily enumerated
categories of impermissive discrimination contained in federal and state civil rights laws. Under
federal law, these categories include race, color, religion, national origin164 and disability.165
State laws similarly prohibit discrimination of the bases enumerated in federal law, but some
states extend the group of protected classifications to include other categories, including marital
status and sexual orientation.166 Despite these explicit prohibitions against health care
discrimination on the basis of personal characteristics, it will likely be the rare physician who
makes a Asmoking gun@ admission to the patient that care is being withheld because of the
person=s race, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, etc.167 Overwhelmingly,
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treatment denials will be justified on the basis of physician autonomy, unrelated to the personal
characteristics of the patient which would amount to impermissive discrimination.
Proponents of physician autonomy in the provision of ART services might look to a
companion area of the law which permits doctors to refuse to provide certain types of health care
services on moral or ethical grounds. In an earlier work on physician autonomy, I described the
most striking example of this legislative safe harbor B the performance of abortion. A majority
of states permit physicians and other ancillary health care workers to opt out of participating in
the procedure on the ground that it offends his or her conscience.168 I argued that Athese abortion
refusal statutes demonstrate...that our society is sensitive to the fact that doctors are not mere
technicians who, because of their special training, must use their skills whenever asked. Instead,
society accords physicians a right to moral autonomy in selected clinical settings.@169 In my
mind, this statement rings as true today as it did over a decade ago. But it must be analyzed in
the specific clinical setting at issue herein B the selective provision and denial of ART services.
My first foray into physician autonomy involved cases of medical futility B the provision
of care to critically ill patients who were unlikely to receive any medical benefit from the
requested treatment. The clash at the bedside pitted family members demanding intensive care
for loved ones whose conditions would not be aided by the treatment, against physicians whose
medical judgment dictated that treatment should be withheld or withdrawn because it provided
no benefit to the patient. In such clashes, forcing physicians to continue to provide medically
ineffective care is an assault on their professional integrity and a violation of their professional
autonomy.170 The solution, it seemed to me, was to allow physicians to exercise their autonomy
by transferring patients to other willing providers with the assistance of neutral hospital-based
committees that could evaluate the merits of each physician=s claim for dismissal from the
patient=s care.171 Is this solution of elective transfer also a viable solution for physicians who
wish to refuse to provide ART to certain populations? No it is not.
services were being withheld because of her marital status).
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Transfer rights in the case of medical futility allow doctors to implement their medical
judgment about a patient=s clinical condition. Transfer rights in the case of selective ART
refusals would allow doctors to express their personal animus toward a patient=s personal
characteristics. Cases of treatment refusal involving medical futility or abortion share the
commonality that what is being refused is based on the nature of the procedure, not the nature of
the patient. If doctors were to refuse to provide ventilator support, for example, only to Black
patients, or Jewish patients, or Asian patients, while providing such support to other patients with
identical medical profiles, this conduct would be wholly impermissive. Likewise, if obstetricians
refused to perform abortions only on White patients, but agreed to abort all other races, the racebased discrimination would be obvious and actionable.
ART treatment denials are never wholesale refusals to provide a specific procedure; they
are selective refusals to provide treatment to specific individuals. In fact, ART providers are
solicited by prospective parents of all stripes because of their skill in performing AID, IVF, IUI
and the like. Physicians who routinely provide these services in their practices should not be able
to withhold these treatment on the basis of patient personal characteristics, so long as the
treatments would be provided to other patients with similar medical profiles. Such a policy does
not prevent physicians from exercising their medical judgment. Telling a single woman, or a
woman with a lesbian partner, that IUI is not available to her, while providing IUI to a married
woman is not an expression of the physician=s medical judgment, but rather an expression about
the worthiness of single and gay women as parents. Physicians should not use patients as a
means to express their views about the social context of parenthood.172
To say that ART physician autonomy is not absolute is not to say that doctors have a
duty to fulfill all requests for service. Inescapably, ART involves the welfare of more than one
person B the parent and the child. Treatment decisions can and should take into account known
or significantly suspected characteristics that would render the parent(s) unable to deliver a
decent minimum of child-rearing. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine has
pondered this question of when, if ever, ART providers should decline to treat patients they
believe pose a substantial risk of harm to offspring. In balancing the reproductive rights of
infertile individuals against the duty to respect the well-being of offspring, the ASRM Ethics
Committee propounded that Afertility programs should be attentive to serious child-rearing
deficiencies in their patients, and if they have a substantial, non-arbitrary basis for thinking that
parents will provide inadequate child-rearing, they should be free to refuse to provide treatment
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In a recent Ethics Committee Report, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
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services to such patients.@173 According to the ASRM, examples of Asubstantial, non-arbitrary
basis@ for concern about parental adequacy include uncontrolled psychiatric illness, a history of
child or spousal abuse, or drug abuse.174
I agree that physician discretion to deny ART is warranted in certain situations, but would
support this value on grounds different than those articulated by the ASRM. Basing a physician=s
ability to deny ART services on his or her prediction about the child-rearing abilities of a
prospective parent is speculative and leaves too much opportunity for masking pure
discrimination with concern for offspring. Instead, providers should be able to deny ART
services if they believe the patient=s well-being will be negatively affected by the treatment. Just
as intensive care physicians should have the right to refuse to provide nonbeneficial care to
irreversibly ill patients, ART providers should be able to withhold services they reasonably
believe would cause harm to a person. Admittedly, this window of refusal is decidedly narrow,
but it is not nonexistent. For example, it may be reasonable for an ART provider to conclude that
a woman with uncontrolled psychiatric illness or a history of drug abuse would not fare well
during pregnancy. She may be unable to manage the physical and psychological burdens of
pregnancy, causing harm to herself or others. Likewise, a woman who is the subject of spousal
abuse might be an even greater target of violence, as studies show that abused women report
higher levels of violence during pregnancy.175
Though perhaps at first blush counterintuitive, reducing physician autonomy to deny ART
services is beneficial to providers of assisted conception technologies. Put another way,
physicians suffer harm when they individually or collectively impose barriers to treatment by
private acts of discrimination against individuals who are as medically and socially capable of
bearing children as their fertile counterparts. Patient defection and loss of confidence B either
among the rejected patients or even among those who support the latter group=s right to
reproduce B can be devastating to a physician=s practice.
Without opportunities to deny treatment on the basis of personal characteristics unrelated
to patient well-being, physicians can operate in an environment of medical objectivity and
administrative certainty. For physicians who remain refractory to providing ART services to
certain populations on moral grounds, they cannot reasonably expect to be permitted to use their
state-issued medical license for purposes of discrimination. For the vast majority of physicians
who recognize the value and import of access to ART for virtually all, the rewards in patient trust
and regard substantially outweigh any perceived reduction in autonomy. After all, without
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patient support, physicians would suffer a total deprivation of livelihood.

C. HARMS TO ART CHILDREN
Barriers to ART access profoundly affect family formation, forcing childlessness on those
who have never procreated, and limiting the growth of existing families whose progenitors
experience secondary infertility after the birth of one or more children. The harms from forced
childlessness and constriction of family growth impair the dignitary and procreational autonomy
rights of prospective parents, as previously discussed. But do denials of ART services cause
harm to offspring? Unlike their actual or prospective parents, ART offspring do not have the
capacity to be harmed in their dignitary or procreational rights, as they possess no such rights.
Offspring who are never born because their infertile potential parents met insurmountable
barriers to ART lack existence, but does this mean they lack the ability to be harmed by treatment
denials? And what about harm to existing children who are denied siblings because of ART
barriers? Let us now consider whether barriers to ART access cause harm to existent and
nonexistent children.

1. THE NEVER BORN
Can a person who was never born experience harm from lack of existence? This question
trends toward the philosophical, and its answer may proceed from an assumption about the merits
of being born. If human existence, in and of itself, is assumed to be good, then its denial may be
said to cause harm. But if human existence is assumed to be less than good, or at least equivocal,
then it is less certain that its denial can cause harm. The moral value of procreation as a human
activity has garnered at least two schools of thought B one celebrating its absolute goodness and
one more cautiously balancing the benefits and harms that are attendant to every human birth.
The position that procreation is an absolute good was recently articulated by the Ethics
Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine. Commenting of the Aethical
paradox@ that arises when harm to ART offspring is avoided by avoiding the birth of offspring
altogether, the Committee took the position that Athe birth of a child is deemed a good in itself,
and helping the parents achieve that goal is a morally worthwhile endeavor.@176 This attitude that
being born is itself a good, even if one=s life is unwanted or miserable, finds support in the law of
torts which largely shuns the legal cause of action for wrongful life B a claim by a child for
damages sustained as a result of his or her creation.177 Claiming they are ill-equipped to decide,
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as a legal matter, Awhether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been born with
even gross deficiencies,@ courts punt this mystery by denying recovery for claims related to
wrongful life.178
The alternative view that procreation brings both benefits and harms, in every case, is
articulated by Professor Seana Shiffrin in an essay discussing the merits of wrongful life as a
viable legal claim. She maintains that Aprocreation is a morally hazardous activity because in all
cases it imposes significant risks and burdens upon the children who result.@179 Being created,
Professor Shiffrin argues, Acan benefit a person in part, or overall, should her life be sufficiently
worth living, and that it is also possible that being created can harm a person.@180 On balance,
Professor Shiffrin takes a morally equivocal view toward procreation as a routine matter, because
of its inevitably beneficial and burdensome nature.
These articulations of the moral value of procreation are generally not abstract, but arise
in the context of procreation gone awry. When a child is born disabled, either the result of a
physician=s negligent failure to warn parents of a likely congenital defect, or the result of a
negligently performed abortion or surgical sterilization, anguished parents seek compensation for
the lifelong burden they will bear. With the child presented as Adamages,@ the legal system is
forced to consider the value of the child=s diminished life. The question of whether a suffering
child=s life is worth more or less than a nonexistent life must be resolved if culpability is to be
allocated in a legal context.
But in the context of ART barriers, the equation comparing the benefits and harms of
existence against those of nonexistence is not the same as the calculation made in the wrongful
life arena. The numerator B the value of the child=s diminished existence B is zero when ART
services are denied because the child never comes into existence. In wrongful life cases, the
numerator represents the life of an actual child, thus must be either a positive number (child
experiences overall benefit) or a negative number (child experiences overall harm). In either
case, the value of an existing child=s actual life can be compared to the harm or benefit of
suffering).
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nonexistence. If one assumes that the denominator B the harm to a never born child B is also
zero, because nonexistent children cannot undergo harm if they are not created181 B then
measuring the harms from wrongful life v. harms from ART denials or barriers will always yield
different results. In wrongful life cases, some number, either positive or negative will emerge, to
represent the value of the child=s diminished life. But in cases of ART denials, since both the
numerator and the denominator are assumed to be zero, one would conclude there is no net harm
because no child suffers as a result of human activity.
The problem with this analysis is that it fails to take into account that the vast of majority
B if not all B barriers to ART are not based on concerns for the welfare of the child. In cases
where prospective parents are poor, or minority, or single, or gay, there is no evidence that these
features cause a child to be born into a life of misery and suffering. Probably only in the latter
cases of single and same sex parents do ART providers refuse to provide treatment because they
have concerns about the patient=s child-rearing abilities. Numerous studies have shown these
concerns to be unfounded. On balance, children of single and gay parents fare as well or as
poorly as children raised in marital and heterosexual homes.182 Thus, ART barriers are
universally preventing a positive activity B the birth of a healthy child into a nurturing family
environment. When one considers the potential benefit to such children, it no longer makes
sense to conclude that the never born suffer no harm from ART barriers.
Suppressing or restricting access to safe and effective methods of assisted conception to
individuals who, if they reproduced naturally would be as likely as any other parent to produce a
healthy child and provide a positive rearing experience, seems a deprivation of liberty for both
the prospective parent and would-be child. Never born children can be said to suffer harm when
their very creation is thwarted for reasons unrelated to their own well-being. However,
recognizing that never born offspring can experience harm does not necessarily mean that legal
remedies must be forthcoming that award damages on the basis of a theoretical child=s worth.
Instead, other remedies that address physician denials, as set forth in Part IV(A)(3), can be
fashioned to encompass harms that arise when offspring are denied an opportunity to exist.
Calculating damages according to the loss suffered by a prospective patient would seem to
suitably compensate for the loss of a potential human being.

3. THE BORN
Individuals who seek ART are not necessarily childless. They may have conceived
naturally one or more times, but later experience infertility.183 Or they may have procreated
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using ART, but now face a barrier to accessing assisted conception to expand their extant family.
In either case, barriers to ART impact on existing children in ways that can be harmful to their
well-being.
For a child or children whose parents are experiencing infertility following natural
conception, the pain and frustration of failing to conceive may come to infect the family
dynamic. The psychological stress on the family may be even greater if the parents= inability to
expand the family is attributable to one or more barriers to ART access. Parents who lack
insurance coverage for assisted conception and cannot afford to pay for these medical services
out of pocket may stretch the family=s resources to fund treatment. If the treatment fails, or even
if it is successful, the parents may face tremendous debt that detracts from their ability to
properly care for the existing children. In addition to economic barriers, couples with secondary
infertility may encounter ART barriers due to their race or ethnicity. An African or Arab
American couple, for example, may shun treatment for fear of confronting a provider=s
stereotypic attitudes toward their reproduction.184 Inevitably these attitudes, real or perceived,
will become known to the existing children, threatening dignitary harm to a second generation.
For children who were conceived using ART whose parent(s) desires another child,
subsequent barriers to assisted conception can impact the self-worth and identity of these first
born children. For example, a child born via AID may feel the absence of a father in her life, and
long for a connection with a sibling who understands the unique circumstances of her birth.185
In fact, it is becoming increasingly common for donor-conceived children to search each other
out, helped along by the internet, so as to make a connection with a genetically related
individual.186 Closing the door to family expansion means that ART children will not enjoy the
companionship of siblings who share the distinct nature of their conception. While it is certainly
true that only children thrive in this world, single ART children whose parents face
insurmountable barriers to family expansion may interpret their singleness as a wrong that is
being addressed by repressing further similar births.
Children whose parents face ART barriers may be part of a newly blended family
and naturally conceiving one or more children B is fairly common. According to a 1995 survey by the
National Center for Health Statistics, 3.3 million American women were experiencing secondary infertility.
This represented an increase from 1988, when 2.7 million women were affected by secondary infertility.
See http://www.pregnancy-info.net/infertility_secondary_infertility.html.
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configuration. For example, a woman who was previously married, or who had a child as a
single woman via AID, may now be part of a same sex relationship. If the new couple wishes to
expand their family but is unable to do so because they encounter marital status or sexual
orientation discrimination, their existing children may view this treatment denial as an expression
of society=s negative view toward their nontraditional family. The child comes to symbolizes the
unworthiness of the family unit. Conversely, bringing much wanted children into a newly
blended family may be a sign of strength in the developing relationships, a sign that could
reassure existing children about the stability of their own place in the family unit and the world
around them.
Whether children are in traditional or nontraditional settings, one cannot discount the
impact that functional or structural infertility could have on their lives. A parent=s frustration
over the inability to further reproduce, whether attributable to medical or social causes, can easily
bleed into the parent/child relationship, igniting a host of feelings within the child ranging from
empathy, to helplessness, to fear, to self-doubt. While infertility may be a medical condition that
is resistant to all forms of treatment, it should not be an opportunity for social engineering.
Parents who require assistance in reproduction are no more or less worthy of the opportunity for
parenthood than their fertile counterparts. Treatment denials based on subjective perceptions of
parental worth can morph into societal expressions about the worth of selected ART children and
their parents. It is to this expressivist argument that we now turn.

D. HARMS TO SOCIETY
At the outset of this article, we noted the prevalence of ART-conceived children in
today=s society, at last count approaching 3% of the total U.S. population.187 Though growing,
the number of individuals and couples who look to ART for family formation is still low on an
absolute scale, prompting one to question whether barriers for these few prospective parents have
any impact on society as a whole. Is denial of assistance in reproduction to a single individual
worthy of redress by comprehensive measures that reach beyond the life of the individual? I
argue such redress is both appropriate and necessary because of the import of the societal
interests at stake.
Constructing or refusing to dismantle barriers to human reproduction causes harm to
society in at least two ways. First, policies or formal laws that reduce access to ART on the basis
personal characteristics that are unrelated to child-rearing capacity express attitudes that unfairly
stigmatize the population to which these barriers apply. Formal expressions of stigma are
harmful to both the individuals being stigmatized as well as the society from which they hail.
Second, imposition of reproductive regimes that deny procreative rights to certain members of a
society are dangerously reminiscent of our eugenics past. While the eugenicists of a century ago
187
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coerced the Afeeble minded@ into surrendering their reproductive capacity through forced
surgeries,188 today=s practices act to deprive the disempowered of their capacity to reproduce by
withholding the means necessary to produce a child. Whether by coercion or deprivation,
removing reproductive decision-making from the individual has broad, negative consequences
for society as a whole.

1. THE EXPRESSIVIST ARGUMENT
All conduct, according to some legal theorists, expresses values and attitudes on the part
of the actor. Whether the actor is an individual, a group, or the State, the expression of negative
or inappropriate attitudes toward a person causes harm to that individual. This Aexpressive harm@
is addressed by the expressive theory B a theory which strives to direct actors to act in ways that
express appropriate attitudes toward various substantive values.189 As applied to law, expressive
theorist measure actions by governments according to the message that state-backed actions
convey.190 One legal scholar explains that expressive theories of law Aconverge on the idea that
wrongful governmental expressive acts matter because of the stigma they involve; the theories
argue that government should neither make nor enforce laws that express attitudes that unfairly
stigmatize people.@191 Expressive theory works to decipher the message that government-back
action sends by studying the reaction it generates in individuals, groups and the State.192
As applied to access to assisted conception, attitudes toward those who face functional or
structural infertility193 are expressed in at least two ways - by enacted law and by physician
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conduct. Enacted law on the subject of ART access is sparse, but what we can glean from the
few existing laws may be instructive. Legal expressions of ART access generally take the form
of reducing access to certain individuals, mainly those who are poor and those who are
unmarried. The infertile poor do not fare well under our current system of fee-for-service
reproductive care for the simple reason that they lack the resources to access infertility treatment.
The majority of U.S. states do not require insurance carriers to provide coverage for infertility
treatment,194 and in the handful of states that do mandate coverage, evidence suggests that
employer-based insurance providers often exempt key forms of treatment195 or impose
insurmountable co-payment requirements that dissuade utilization.196 Thus, arguably both
enacted and neglected laws on insurance coverage for ART express a negative attitude toward its
utilization by those who cannot afford to pay for these expensive services out of pocket.
A second group of enacted laws on ART access limits certain treatments and services to
married couples. For example, one particular form of ART B gestational services B is limited to
married couples in two states, Florida and Texas. Florida law provides, AA contract for
gestational surrogacy shall not be binding and enforceable unless...the commissioning couple are
legally married and are both 18 years of age or older.@197 Presumably this law, and a similar
requirement in Texas,198 would void any surrogacy contract entered into a by single individual or
a same sex couple. While access to surrogacy by single and same sex parents is not prohibited,
the dubious enforceability of any gestational agreement is a serious deterrent to family formation
in this manner by unmarried individuals. In addition to these enacted laws, at least two states
have entertained bills that would prohibit physicians from providing assisted conception services
to all unmarried individuals.199
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Physician conduct expressing negative views toward certain patients may be less apparent
in the public sphere, but these stigmatizing attitudes are discernable upon careful inspection. In
at least one reported case that is currently pending before the California Supreme Court, a
physician group was sued by a former patient for refusing to provide ART on the basis of her
sexual orientation.200 This case may be the proverbial Atip of the iceberg@ as data suggests
discrimination against unmarried and same sex individuals is fairly widespread. In survey data,
results show that ART providers are disinclined to provide services to certain individuals on the
basis of marital status and sexual orientation. In one recent survey, one in five providers said
they were Avery or extremely likely to turn away@ a single woman, 48% said they would turn
away a gay male couple who wanted to use surrogacy, and 53% said they would refuse to assist a
single male.201 As to racial status, studies reveal that doctors are significantly and substantially
more likely to have a variety of negative stereotypes about African American than other
patients.202 If these racial views infect the ART field, as there is no reason to believe they don=t,
they express negative and stigmatizing attitudes toward minority patients.
Enacted law and physician conduct that limit or reduce access to ART cause expressive
harm to prospective patients, to others who share the despised characteristics of the shunned
patients, and to the children of both of these groups of adults. Expressive harm is measured by
the unwarranted stigma it causes its victim.203 Stigma, according to Professor Alan Strudler, Ais
harm, even if not tangible or monetary harm, and harm, particularly wrongful harm, should not
be taken lightly.@204 Patients who seek but are denied ART services suffer stigma by being cast
out of the core group of human beings that exercise their natural inclination to reproduce. As
discussed previously, infertility itself is a stigma205 B one that is surely exacerbated when patients
are turned away from treatment. Denying treatment expresses a view that the patient is herself
unworthy of parenthood, and therefore unworthy of membership in the human race. If one
believes that one=s individual worth can only be validated by the production of offspring B whose
mere existence confirm that their progenitor has value B then denying the right to biologic
parenthood imposes an irrecoverable stigma.
200

See North Coast Women=s Care Medical Group v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636
(2006), rev. granted, 139 P.3d 1, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 605, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 99103.
201

See Gurmankin & Caplan, supra note 98 , at 65.

202

See White & McQuillan, supra note 34, at 855.

203

As Professor Strudler explains, not all stigma is unwarranted. Stigmatizing people who
commit crimes, for example, serves a legitimate law enforcement goal. Stigmatizing tortfeasors expresses
society=s empathy for victims of wrongdoing. See Strudler, supra note 191, at 494-95.
204

Id. at 495.

205

See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.

60

Even people who themselves are not denied access to ART can be stigmatized by the
expressive harms suffered by rejected patients. For example, a lesbian couple with no desire to
procreate may learn of the disappointment suffered by other gay couples in their quest to have a
child. Even though the voluntarily childless couple will suffer no measurable consequence from
the treatment denial, they may be profoundly affected by the attitude expressed toward their
peers. Inevitably, as is human nature, the lesbian couple may internalize their friends= experience
as a message about their own worth as human beings. The couple may wonder B if providers are
willing to withhold ART services because of their negative attitudes toward gay parents, why
would they also not have negative attitudes toward gay people in general? The couple may worry
B if gay people are denied access to parenthood, the most basic of human activities, then what is
to stop society from denying them all manner of human rights? Living with this worry can be
both stigmatizing and stultifying. If the negative attitudes of providers are seen as representative
of societal attitudes in general, such worrying is both justified and necessary.
The idea that a person can feel stigmatized from the presence of a single trait or
characteristic has been described in the literature expounding the disability rights critique. As
explained by Professor Adrienne Asch, a disability rights scholar, when a child has a disability,
Aa single trait stands in for the whole, the trait obliterates the whole@ with Ano need to find out
about the rest.@206 In the context of disabilities and prenatal testing, detection of a genetic
disability often leads to selective abortion because the parents view the fetus only in terms of the
disability, paying no regard to the myriad other qualities of the potential child. The parent sees
the prospective child only as the disability, and this single trait enables the parents to justify their
action. The abortion is ridding society of the disability B not of a child who, despite or possibly
because of the disability, could lead a productive and happy life.
This sequence of events B prenatal diagnosis followed by selective abortion B sends a
message, i.e., Aexpresses@, that disability itself, not societal discrimination against people with
disabilities, is the problem to be solved.207 Why is disability itself a problem? The disability
rights critique argues that disability is seen as a problem not to the disabled person (whose main
problem is the attitudes of others toward disability), but rather as a diminishment to the parental
experience. Having a disabled child, prospective parents worry, will rob them of their
anticipated rearing experience. Thus, aborting a disabled child is a way of preserving and
upholding parental notions about the role that reproduction will play in their lives.208
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With very little modification, the disability rights critique of prenatal diagnosis can be
applied to selection against nontraditional patients seeking assistance in reproduction. The
notion that a single trait obliterates the whole is certainly the case when ART treatment denials
are based on the marital status or sexual orientation of the patient. Instead of being seen as a
person who can provide a loving and nurturing environment for a child, as is the case in
innumerable gay and single households, the prospective patient is viewed as Aunmarried@ or
Agay,@ and this characteristic obliterates any evidence of parental fitness. Instead of trying to
address societal discrimination against single or same sex parents, permissive ART treatment
denials reinforce such attitudes by expressing approval for suppression of nontraditional
parenthood.
The expressivist argument that treatment denials harm all who share the despised trait
seems weighty and valid in the context of assisted conception: denying procreation to single and
same sex individuals signals that nontraditional parenthood is a problem to be solved, not
understood and accommodated, because of the threat is poses to society as a whole. Just as a
child=s disability is viewed as a diminishment to the parental experience, the offspring of
nontraditional parents are viewed as a diminishment of a certain persistent myth in contemporary
society B the myth that only married couples can bring joy into the life of a child. Purposefully
withholding the means to reproduce sends a message to would-be parents, to existing children of
nontraditional parents and to society at large that unmarried individuals, and by extension their
offspring, lack value in today=s world.
Allowing such antiquated and outright inaccurate expressions of parental fitness seems to
serve no current legitimate societal purpose. As birth by single women and same sex couples
continues to climb, discrimination against nontraditional parenthood will only serve to highlight
the negative attitudes of those who wield control over assisted conception. Whether these
individuals are ART providers who are privileged by the State to practice reproductive medicine,
lawmakers who are privileged by the people to represent their best interests, or judges who are
privileged by the judicial system to evaluate the merits of alleged public and private wrongdoing,
neither the government nor society as a whole should tolerate negative expressive act because of
the stigma they involve. Permitting one group to be stigmatized only invites tolerance for future
stigma against others. Besides, as history proves, what is seen as a legitimate basis for stigma at
one moment in time, reveals itself to be totally unfounded a brief moment later. The current
debate over access to ART would be well-served by looking to a prior era when procreation
suppression was seen as a boon to the betterment of society. That boon B the eugenics
movement B was founded on some of the same ideals that motivate current treatment denials, and
thus may be useful in shaping our current thinking on who should and who should not have
access to assisted conception.
2. REVISITING OUR EUGENICS PAST
The regulation of reproduction in this country is often haunted by specter of the American
eugenics movement, a groundswell for improvements in human nature through selective
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breeding that gained support during the dawn of the 20th century. Coined in the 1880s by Francis
Galton, a Victorian aristocrat and nephew of Charles Darwin, the term Aeugenics@ originates from
the Greek word Aeugenes,@ meaning good in birth. Galton and his colleagues harnessed the
growing enthusiasm over the infant, yet burgeoning field of genetics to advance the concept of
controlled human reproduction. Eugenicists believed that most social problems were caused by
hereditary faults of those afflicted by the problem, and they sought to eventually eliminate these
problems from society through selective breeding.
One of the chosen methods for Aimproving@ the human future was a series of compulsory
sterilization laws, eventually enacted in more than 30 U.S. states.209 The laws were broadly
drawn, applying to a host of human characteristics, including insanity, criminality, chronic
illness, blindness, deafness, physical disability, feeble-mindedness, and homelessness.210 No
doubt the strongest sign of judicial support for state-sponsored selective breeding came in the
1927 Supreme Court decision, Buck v. Bell.211 Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. upheld a Virginia law permitting sterilization of Amental defectives@ in order to
promote Athe welfare of society.@212 In language that what would (hopefully) strike the modern
ear as extraordinarily offensive and wrong, Justice Holmes condones, even celebrates the law,
saying A[i]t is better for all the world, if...society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.@213
At issue in the case was an order to sterilize eighteen year-old Carrie Buck, described as
Aa feeble-minded white woman.@214 Carrie and her mother were committed to the State Colony
for Epileptics and Feeble Minded, the former because she was Athe mother of an illegitimate
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feeble-minded child.@215 For this, Justice Holmes validated the sterilization order, decreeing
A[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.@216 As it turns out, neither Carrie Buck nor her
daughter, Vivian, were Afeeble-minded.@ Carrier=s sole transgression was being the victim of a
rape that left her pregnant by a relative of her foster parents, and records show Vivian was an
honor roll student in her school years.217
The Court=s assurance that ending the Buck line was in the best interest of society was as
misguided and unfounded then as denying single and same sex parenthood is today. Permitting
those with the power to prevent procreation to do so in a way that elevates their personal animus
to a level of officialdom is dangerously reminiscent of the forsaken eugenics practice of a bygone
era. We were wrong then to allow certain human conduct to justify forced sterilization, and we
are wrong today to connect a certain social status with harm to offspring and society.
This legacy of state control over procreation has perhaps forever cloaked the term
Aeugenics@ in negative, even loathsome, connotations. Though its literal definition B well born B
does evoke a positive, the term=s association with coercive, highly intrusive, life-altering
measures casts doubt that contemporary use of the word eugenics can signify anything good.218
In fact, the word has crept into the modern critique of ART, in the context of emerging
technologies that enable parents to control the health of their offspring through prenatal testing
and embryo selection. Recent commentators have resurrected the negative view of eugenics to
caution against widespread and unfettered availability of ART, particular techniques that reveal
the genetic health of the early embryo or growing fetus. As Professor Michael Malinowski
warns:
Contemporary genetic medicine promises to add scientific substance and practicality to
what eugenicists set out to accomplish at the outset of the 20th century B improve the
human condition through genetic selection. Given the now dominant ethos of autonomy
and self-determination in medicine, which is underscored by the libertarian elements of
United States culture, there is meaningful assurance that eugenics will not be imposed by
a government body in the United States. However, we must at least recognize the danger
that through ART, the genetics revolution, and carte blanche procreative liberty we could
do unto ourselves via the collective impact of individual decision-making what
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governments have imposed in the past in the name of bettering the human condition.219
Professor Malinowski points out that today=s eugenics arise as a matter of private choice, rather
than the public regulation that sanctioned controlled reproduction a century ago. Nevertheless,
he and other commentators maintain that the evils of eugenics arise not out of the source
espousing a desire for human improvement (public law v. private choice), but out of coercion.
What makes eugenics morally objectionable is its association with coercion.220 Whether the
coercion is instituted by state actors who handcuff and dissect the ill-bred so they cannot
reproduce, or, as some argue, the ethos of society that overvalues perfection and subtly
encourages women to avoid and abort a differently-abled child,221 the lack of free will is at the
core of negative eugenics. When a person lacks the free will to decide whether or not to
reproduce, a great harm is done to the individual and to society.
Are the barriers to ART access discussed herein B cost, race, ethnicity, marital status,
domicile-specific restrictions B a form of modern day eugenics? True enough, none of these
barriers coerce individuals to surrender their reproductive capacity or refrain from reproducing
should the ability to do so arise. But isn=t the deprivation of reproductive opportunity just as
coercive as any formal, explicit directive to forgo offspring? While Acoercion implies the
presence of formal, legal barriers to choice; to others, practical impediments such as economic
costs and social pressures function coercively.@222 The coercive eugenic nature of ART barriers
come into sharp focus upon inspection of the individuals whose access to assisted conception is
most suppressed B poor, minority, unmarried individuals who historically lack political and
economic power. These are the very individuals, who like their early 20th century counterparts,
are not terribly welcome in a society that measures human improvement by its ability to coalesce
around a set of homogeneous characteristics. Introducing difference into the mix is viewed as
interfering with the steady march toward human betterment.
A system need not literally castrate or ligate in order to be deemed eugenic. While ART
has evoked concerns of eugenics because it empowers parents to select against what they
perceive as a defective child, too little attention has been paid to the more worrisome practices
219

Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics
PastBPresent, and Future?, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 125, 204 (2003).
220

A[W]hat people object to in eugenics is not the goal, such as improving the health of the
population, but the means employed to achieve it.@ Mahowald, supra note 190, at 223-24, quoting Diane
B. Paul, Eugenics, Anxieties, Social Realities, and Political Choices, in ARE GENES US? THE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW GENETICS 142, 143045 (Carl. F. Cranor ed., 1994).
221

See, e.g., Barbara Rothschild, THE DREAM OF THE PERFECT CHILD (2005) (arguing rapid
advances in prenatal testing has engendered a culture of discrimination against those with disabilities and
pressured women to abort pregnancies when any defect is detected).
222

Mahowald, supra note 190, at 224.

65

that deny reproductive opportunities to the most vulnerable among us.223 Unlike the eugenic
laws at issue before the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma or Buck v. Bell, today=s version
of reproductive deprivation is a patchwork of mostly informal policies quietly practiced by
insurance companies, ART providers and select lawmakers whose activities threaten to
institutionalize discrimination against nontraditional parents. So long as ART remains an
exclusively private good that is largely inaccessible to the least well-off among us, a good
capable of being withheld without legal consequence, birth by assisted conception will take on a
eugenic quality that rivals the goals of the early movement B repression of breeding by those
deemed unworthy of dynastic participation in the human race.

V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional jurisprudence surrounding assisted conception is only beginning to
take shape, guided by little more than a generalized notion that the state=s interest in preventing
or forcing procreation pales in comparison to the individual=s fundamental right to decide
whether to bear or beget a child. When conception occurs naturally, both positive and negative
rights surrounding procreation are fairly clear, but grow murky as the reproductive process
invites third parties to assist. As methods of assisted conception show increasing technical
promise for those whose bodies or social structures require they look to ART for family
formation, worrying trends suggest that public and private actors are quietly mounting statusbased barriers to fertility treatment. Barriers to ART are taking shape on the basis of patient
characteristics including wealth status, race, ethnicity, and marital status, all under the guise of
preventing harm to offspring and society at large. But judgments by ART providers and public
lawmakers that certain individuals will be unfit parents veers dangerously close to the coercive
eugenics practices of early 20th century America, an era whose only positive legacy is the extreme
caution with which we now approach state-sponsored limitations on reproduction.
Like a pentimento, ART barriers are only beginning to come into view from the
experiences of an increasingly diverse and nontraditional reproductive medicine patient
population. As each barrier emerges B whether it be a provider refusing treatment to a single or
same sex prospective parent, or a lawmaker attempting to limit the availability of a reproductive
technology for reasons unrelated to human health B it is essential to evaluate these actions by the
same standards we would evaluate barriers to natural conception. Ameliorative measures,
including broader health insurance coverage for fertility treatment and antidiscrimination statutes
tailor-made to address ART denials based on personal characteristics, offer the prospect of
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increased access and reduced discrimination in the provision of ART services. State-sponsored
or state-approved limitations on any individual=s right to procreate simply cannot stand in a
society that acknowledges the preeminence of reproductive freedom. Justice Douglas= selfevident observation that reproduction is a basic human right is as durable and universal as the
human race B it simply must be nurtured in order to continue to thrive.
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